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Disqualifications of Decisional Officials
in Rulemaking
Peter L. Strauss*
What constraints on impartiality govern agency officials responsible for de-
cisions in proceedings other than on-the-record adjudications? The past few years
have witnessed the emergence of a striking body of professional debate, statute,
and case law concerning ethics in government and the control of "special in-
terest" influence on governmental decisions. Higher standards for conflict of
interest, expanded constraints on ex parte communications, and enlarged con-
cems about separation of functions within the agencies are parts of this develop-
ment. Another strand, tangled with the others yet doctrinally distinct, concerns
the disqualification of responsible government officials for their prior contacts
with or expressions of opinion on issues to be brought before them for decision.
In the familiar setting of on-the-record adjudication, near-judicial impartiality is a
conceded requisite. Today, arguments for disqualification are being pressed with
vigor, and responded to, well beyond this setting. This paper is addressed to
these developments. 0
I. THE DISQUALIFICATION PROBLEM
Several recent cases illustrate the emerging controversies. The best known is
Association of National Advertisers v. Federal Trade Commission (ANA), 1 which
arose in the course of rulemaking proposing constraints on television advertising
directed at children. The rulemaking was to be conducted under the specialized
rulemaking procedure of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act.2 Ordinarily, agency rulemaking requires only pub-
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1961, Harvard University; LL.B. 1964, Yale
University.
This Article is based on a report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States
in the spring of 1980. The study was provoked by a district court opinion, Association of Nat'l
Advertisers v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1978), which on appeal became the occasion for one
of the very last of Judge Leventhal's opinions, issued posthumously. Association of Nat'l Advertisers
v. FTC, No. 79-1117 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980). The
opinion, a concurrence, was marked by characteristic insight and grace, and reflected the judge's
profound capacity to understand and accommodate the legitimate claims both of government agencies
and of those subject to their regulation. Those who labor in this field will always remain deeply in
his debt.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author. They reflect his consultations
with persons in and out of government, and have been much aided by the Conference's processes,
but the responsibility for them nonetheless remains with him. Richard Andersen, Jeff Shapiro, and
Kay Sherman of the class of 1981 provided valuable research assistance.
Masculine pronouns are used throughout this Article, in conformity with Review style; they
should be understood to refer to women as well as men.
1. No. 79-1117 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
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lished notice of a proposal, an opportunity for written public response, and sub-
sequent publication of the rule together with a "concise general" explanation.
Under the FTC procedures, however, disputed issues of material fact, once iden-
tified, are to be determined on the record using procedures including so much
cross-examination as is appropriate and required for a full and true disclosure. 3
Before the rulemaking had begun, but in apparent response to a petition for
rulemaking filed by two "public interest" groups, Michael Pertschuk, the Com-
mission's Chairman, made a number of statements reasonably taken as indicating
strong views on the need and justification for regulating television advertising
aimed at children. 4  Later, the Commission's staff published an extensive Staff
Report on Televised Advertising to Children,5 and the Commission announced
the formal initiation of a rulemaking proceeding. It sought comment on remedial
measures its staff had proposed and solicited further suggestions from other
sources, identifying sixteen broad issues as particularly (but not exclusively) de-
serving of comment.' These issues included matters about which Chairman
Pertschuk had previously expressed strong opinions-for example, whether chil-
dren younger than a certain age would ordinarily understand the commercial
purpose of advertising or whether the consumption of sugared products at or
between mealtimes contributes to tooth decay. Shortly after the notice was pub-
lished, and thus before "disputed issues of material fact," if any, could be
identified, 7 the Association of National Advertisers sought Chairman Pertschuk's
disqualification from further participation in the proceeding because he had al-
legedly prejudged the matters to be determined. Replying that he held only "ten-
tative views on policy issues or legislative facts," the Chairman declined to
remove himself from the proceeding. He was upheld in this by the Commission 8
3. These procedures have been the subject of recent intense study and a report, including re-
commendations, to Congress by the Administrative Conference. See ACUS Recommendation 79-1,
44 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (1979). The study did not reach disqualification issues. The Commission's
efforts to regulate television advertising to children, although never yet brought near the point of
effective action, have already been the subject of considerable dispute. E.g., Matter of ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1183 (1973); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611
(D.C. Cir. 1979). Legislative controls are also under active consideration.
4. For example, he appeared before one of the groups that had submitted the rulemaking peti-
tion to discuss the legal theories and tactics by which controls over advertising to children could be
achieved. He wrote the Administrator of the Food and Drug Administration of his "'conviction ...
that one of the evils flowing from the unfairness of children's advertising is the resulting distortion of
children's perceptions of nutritional values," and went on to explain the tactics of securing a readily
defended rule to curb the "commercial exploitation of children," particularly with respect to the sale
of sugared products.
5. The Report was made public on Feb. 5, 1978, and discussed in a public meeting of the
Commission on Feb. 28, 1978.
6. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978).
7. In a separate part of its action, the Commission had set time limits for submission of written
comments and provided for the holding of an informal, "legislative" hearing; at the conclusion of
that hearing, the Commission indicated, it would decide whether "crucial issues" of disputed fact
remained that required a form of on-the-record determination (possibly including cross-examination).
See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978). These procedural arrangements, on the whole consistent with the
Administrative Conference's subsequent recommendations, note 3 supra, have been cast into some
doubt bydicta in the majority opinion in Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. TRR No. 215-60, July 18, 1978.
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and, after a reversal in district court,' by a divided panel in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit."0
In a second case, Chairman Daniel O'Neal of the Interstate Commerce
Commission was challenged by truckers anxious to prevent his participation in a
rulemaking pointing toward deregulation of the trucking industry. In speeches
and other statements the Chairman had indicated that he favored deregulation,
and this the truckers urged was disqualifying. Here only notice and comment
procedures were being employed; a factual as distinct from policy component in
the Chairman's statements was hard to identify; and his comments were gener-
ally milder and more guarded than those of Chairman Pertschuk. When Chair-
man O'Neal declined to disqualify himself, the truckers unsuccessfully sought
injunctive and declaratory relief in federal district court."
In a third case, Carol Foreman, an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, was
participating in an informal rulemaking proceeding concerned with the proper
method for marking the net weight of retail meats. She had made some remarks
suggestive of a point of view in the rulemaking while addressing a consumer
group convention. She had also been closely connected with the award of a
contract to conduct research possibly bearing on the rulemaking-and the con-
tractor was the private organization from which she had come to the government.
For these and related reasons, she was alleged to be carrying forward the private
interests of her previous employer and hence to be an improper decisionmaker in
a public proceeding; disqualification was refused, largely on prematurity
grounds. ' 2
Finally, a controversy arose when Dr. Eula Bingham, Administrator of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), gave a speech to one
group highly interested in the outcome of a rulemaking, after the public com-
ment period had closed but about two weeks before publication of the rule in
final form. She indicated firm views on several strongly contested issues, de-
scribed her forceful political efforts within the government to obtain a rule, and
invited her listeners' political support for the incumbent administration in forth-
coming elections. ' 3  The rulemaking was conducted in hybrid fashion with
9. Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1978).
10. No. 79-1117 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
I1. Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 45 Ad. L.2d 1134 (D.D.C. 1979).
12. Grocery Mfrs. of America v. Foreman, Civ. No. 78-2245 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 1978), appeal
pending, No. 79-1440 (D.C. Cir.).
13. The following passages, excerpted in the petitioner's brief, convey the flavor and range.
Brothers and Sisters ....
Now I want to tell you that we are going to have a Lead Standard. I am deter-
mined, Secretary Marshall is determined, and I'm convinced that the President is com-
mitted. I can tell you that Secretary Marshall and I have been through the palace guard
once to see him about a standard, and if we have to go through that palace guard again,
we shall . . ..
I think that there may be some apprehension because Assistant Secretaries in the
past have not always understood, or have not known how to spell the words medical
removal protection, or rate retention, or whatever the word is that you choose to use,
Well, I learned to spell those words a long time ago on the Coke Oven Advisory Coin-
(Vol. 80:990
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cross-examination permitted as to "crucial issues"; 14 it is to be reviewed on the
basis of a "substantial evidence" standard. The lead industry unsuccessfully ar-
gued to the D.C. Circuit that the Administrator's address reflected disqualifying
bias that invalidated the outcome. 15
Taken together, these cases suggest both an upwelling of controversy about
disqualification issues in informal proceedings, notably rulemakings,16 and a
range of possibly determinative variables bearing on the controversy. All those
seeking disqualification have begun with the more or less familiar judicial anal-
ogy. The responses of the administrators concerned in refusing to disqualify
themselves have in part been to assert that no judge in like circumstances would
be compromised. But they have also stressed that other factors make the judicial
analogy inapposite for rulemakings.
One such factor is suggested by the significant structural differences be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking typically requires the rulemaker
to formulate proposals. That responsibility suggests a general duty to acquire
expertise and perspective regarding the setting in which the rulemaker is to act;
and a specific need to reach the prejudgments necessary for making a particular
proposal and choosing preliminarily among possible formulations of it. Choosing
cases for prosecution is often separated from deciding those cases; but the func-
tion of proposal formulation could not comfortably be separated from the func-
tion of rulemaking itself. The decision how effort is to be allocated in
policymaking is indistinguishable from policymaking, and must be lodged at the
mittee, and if you want to know how I feel about it, you need only to look up my
comments during those Committee Hearings. As far as I'm concerned, it is impossible
to have a Lead Standard without [rate retention] ....
I have told some people that I have never aspired to be an economist, but I tell you
I can smell a phony issue when I see one. And to say that safety and health regulations
are inflationary is phony ....
Between now and next Tuesday (election day), I'm gonna ask that each of you in
this room do a couple of things. First of all, look at the people who are running in your
state, in your congressional district. And look at those people and see 'which ones care
about people and working men and women. These individuals can make a big difference
in your lives, and you know it. I can tell you right now that a big difference will be
made if a Dr. Roy is elected in Kansas, and some of our people are returned to Con-
gress, such as Martha Keyes in Kansas, and a Bob Krueger in Texas, would make a big
difference. And that's what I'm really asking you to do is go out and do what you can
between now and Tuesday to make a big difference to us all.
And I'll do my job, and I don't know how you're gonna help me, but I'm sure you
will.
Consolidated Brief of Industry Petitioners and Intervenors at 25-27, United Steelworkers of America
v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 15, 1980).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(3) (1979), implementing § 6(b) of the Occupational Safety &
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976).
15. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 17-23 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 15, 1980).
16. This Article has been written with informal rulemaking principally in view. Many of its
observations, however, could also be made respecting forms of on-the-record adjudication that are
strongly policy oriented in character, most notably initial licensing. Separation of functions is not
required under the APA in on-the-record licensing proceedings, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976), suggesting
lesser scope for disqualification in these proceedings as well.
1980]
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center.17  It follows that the discussions and judgments antecedent to a proposal
for rulemaking cannot, by the simple fact of their occurrence, disqualify. That is
not to say that tentativeness in reaching these judgments is unimportant; or that a
demonstration of unshakeable prejudgment might not be thought the occasion for
disqualification. But if some measure of prejudgment is essential or inevitable in
the preliminary stages of rulemaking, to that extent at least disqualification is
foreclosed.
Similarly, in the current state of law, rulemaking is regarded as an approp-
riately institutional, not individual, decision. A result is that to the extent dis-
qualification is a concern at all, it may be a concern for a larger and less certain
number of agency employees than would be thought implicated in adjudication.
Even when required to act "on the record," a commissioner is unconstrained by
statutory or constitutional separation of functions requirements in rulemakings.
The sifting and analysis by competent subordinates, which would in any case be
permitted,18 need not exclude staff members who participated in formulation of
the rule and presentation of information bearing on it.' 9 More important, sig-
nificant aspects of decision are likely to have been given effective final shape
below the highest levels of the agency.2 0  Consequently, the field of agency
personnel ultimately identified as decisionmakers may be much larger than would
be the case for on-the-record adjudication. In an adjudication, it is not hard to
identify those who reach the holding of an opinion, and perhaps the few who
help to write any explanation; in rulemaking, the decision lies in a text whose
formulation can involve a sizeable proportion of an agency's management-level
staff. That disqualification rules would have to reach so broadly is an additional
consideration constraining simple application of the judicial model.
Rulemaking can also be differentiated from adjudication on the basis of the
differing relationships of those two procedural forms to other roles that adminis-
17. This point is central to the prevailing opinions in the ANA case, slip op. at 20, 33-38
(Tamm, J.); id. at 4 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Compare the requirement in Exec. Order No.
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978), for semiannual publication by agencies of their rulemaking
agendas. The basic thrust of that order, and of much thinking about rulemaking endeavors today, is
to insist on increasing involvement in and responsibility for rulemaking at the top. Such changes can
be effected only at the cost of enhanced "prejudgment."
18. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
19. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973); American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, J74 F.2d
676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). As is pointed out in an NRC draft report, A Study
of the Separation of Functions and Ex Parte Rules in Nuclear Regulatory Commission Adjudications
for Domestic Licensing 123-28 (1980), the recent decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), has placed this proposition in some doubt for
the future.
Section 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
94 Stat. 374 (1980), added a new section 18(f) to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
15a(k), specifically imposing separation of functions requirements as to "any fact which is relevant
to the merits of such proceeding and which is not on the rulemaking record of such proceeding,
unless such communication is made available to the public and is included in the rulemaking rec-
ord.'"
20. See, e.g., Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38 (1975);
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
874 (1974).
(Vol. 80:990
DISQUALIFICATIONS
trators are called on to perform. Decision in an individual case, at least as dis-
tinct from its policy or rule component, is of limited institutional concern to
Congress, the President, or those generally affected or protected by regulation.
Our political and legal traditions exclude the calling of judges before legislative
committees to explain their decisions, the clearing of proposed decisions with the
President, and nonparty intervention." 1 But we have no such traditions for
policymaking divorced from the decision of particular cases. Congressional over-
sight of administrative policymaking is generally regarded as a good, and current
trends are to increase it; so also for Presidential controls. While dispute has very
recently arisen over whether these controls must be publicly exercised, the
legitimacy of the controls themselves is generally conceded.
Similar differences characterize administrative relations with interested par-
ties outside government. Businessmen who have no need for hints how a particu-
lar case will be decided have a legitimate and pressing concern to learn "the
drift of current policy thinking and planning" at relevant agencies, so that they
may shape their own activities. The hope that businessmen will shape those
activities toward compliance, or that knowledge of the emerging thought will
provoke them into providing information permitting more effective regulation,
warrants the agency's personnel in giving the hints and even in seeking out
opportunities in which to do so. More diffuse public groups, too, have a claim to
hear and be heard on questions concerning the agency's course. Again, there
may be questions whether the interchanges-at the least, those clearly pointed
toward a particular rulemaking-need to be public; but their value is generally
recognized. Disqualification rules need to be consistent with the occurrence of
these events. If attending convention lunches and speaking to "issues of the
day" is a legitimate part of a rulemaker's function, he ought not be disqualified
merely for having done so.
Related to this proposition is the appropriately political character of ap-
pointment to positions of responsibility at the top of the administrative hierarchy.
While judges, too, may in part be selected for their political leanings, no sense
of apology attends that principle of selection in the administrative sphere. Unlike
judges, administrators have a fixed program to carry out, and their success or
failure is measured by their ability to achieve politically defined policy ends. If
policy commitment is a measure of sound appointment, it would be surprising to
find it disabling.
Another frequently distinguishing characteristic of rulemaking concerns the
nonspecific character that often attaches to factual controversies. To be sure,
rulemaking spans a notoriously diverse set of procedures and contexts, from
formal, on-the-record rate-setting premised on ascertainable and historical facts
21. Nonparties may appear, of course, as amici curiae-generally helping the court assess the
possible sweep of a given result more than helping it decide the particular case. In general, amici are
not invited, and their participation is permissive. Amici appearances are not a central feature of
judicial decision; they reflect an accommodation to our recognition that judicial decisions sometimes
have broad policy consequences for which judicial decisions on the usual model may prove in-
adequate. From this perspective, the need for amici in a given case calls into question more than it
reinforces such other elements of the traditional model as independence from the political branches.
1980]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
about particular corporations to informal standard-setting based substantially on
political attitude or on feel for future developments. Rulemaking may produce
standards of general impact on large parts of society, or have the effect of
resolving particular disputes affecting discrete parties with specific interests un-
usually at stake. Generalization is therefore fraught with hazard. There is
nonetheless agreement that factual disputes in rulemaking most frequently con-
cern issues that, if decided by a court at all, are decided under the rubric of
judicial notice rather than trial. "Are children manipulated by television adver-
tisements?" more closely resembles "Are children disadvantaged by segregated
education?" than "Was Jones fired for reasons of race?" The questions may be
susceptible of definitive answer or engender great controversy, but there would
be no constitutional objection to having them decided by a legislature using the
most informal procedures; the basis for Jones's discharge, a question unique to
the case in which it arises, cannot be so decided against Jones's interest.
Finally, in considering the question of disqualification one must take into
account the high current levels of controversy over appropriate rulemaking pro-
cedures generally. As a matter of description, the differences in structure, institu-
tional character of decision, relationship to other agency roles and actors, and
general nature of facts to be determined, all would probably be agreed upon as
distinguishing rulemaking from adjudication. Nonetheless, current scholarship
and judicial decisions reflect disquiet about rulemaking as traditionally under-
stood.22 The disqualification issue is touched by these controversies, particu-
larly by such questions as the extension of "ex parte" concepts to rulemaking,23
the protection of rulemaking from Presidential or congressional influence or pres-
sure, 24 and the extension to rulemaking of separation of functions constraints
currently prescribed by statute only for formal adjudication. 2 5  Each of these
controversies could be said to involve, in a general way, the disputants' estimate
of the importance of "impartiality" or "objectivity" in rulemaking. Is this a
political activity integral to the daily functioning of the agency as a whole and so
subject to all the influences that may come to bear on that functioning? Or is it,
and if so to what degree and in what circumstances, to be dissociated from the
political, from the hurly-burly, and conducted antiseptically? The former view
produces a model of administrators who approximate congressmen, and thus dis-
courages disqualification; the latter suggests the setting for judicial activity and
so encourages the importation of judicial standards.
22. The controversies are well analyzed in DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of
Law and Policy, 65 Va. L. Rev. 257 (1979).
23. Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal
Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 Ad. L. Rev. 377 (1978); ACUS Recommendation 77-3, 1 C.F.R. §
305.77-3 (1980).
24. The Conference has currently pending a study of this problem by Dean Paul Verkuil, see
page 943 supra.
25. The Conference has currently pending a study of this problem by Professor Michael
Asimow. See Ross, ABA Legislative Proposals to Improve Administrative Procedures in Federal
Departments and Agencies, 27 Ad. L. Rev. 395 (1975); Davis, Revising the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 29 Ad. L. Rev. 35, 42-43 (1977); Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of Functions in
Regulatory Agencies, 64 Va. L. Rev. 991 (1978).
[Vol. 80:990
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How, then, are we to proceed? The following pages begin at the outer
limits of analogy, where general agreement exists respecting the constraints ap-
propriate for the analogous procedures, and then work toward the center. The
first limit examined is suggested by the conflict of interest rules prohibiting legis-
lators and executive officials from participating in certain decisions. If particular
conflicts of interest would or should be regarded as disqualifying even in a legis-
lator or executive official, it is supposed here that they should be disqualifying
for a rulemaker, however political we may regard his function to be. An exami-
nation of current trends in thinking about conflicts of interest and the reduced
political controls over most rulemakers may suggest additional measures beyond
those appropriate for an elected legislator or executive. The second limit
examined, the one most frequently reasoned from in the cases, consists of the
disqualification rules applicable to judges (and, by derivation, administrators act-
ing as judges). If some relationships to parties, facts, or issues would not be
treated as disqualifying even in a judge, the rulemaker can hardly be disabled. In
particular, if judges are not disqualified for their prior exposure to social fact or
their political or policy views, rulemakers are by hypothesis similarly free, what-
ever restraints are placed on the way in which they acquire, process, and use
information. Indeed, given the more focused policy responsibilities of adminis-
trators and the political considerations that, legitimately, so often underlie their
appointment, disqualification for policy views would be astonishing.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON POLITICIANS: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST MODEL
A. Congressional, Executive, and Professional Disqualification
If one searches outside the administrative and judicial realms for indications
of conduct or associations regarded as disqualifying from participation in gov-
ernment action, one finds broad agreement that personal financial interests are
disqualifying, and little else. Thus, the provisions of the United States Code
dealing with bribery, graft, and conflicts of interests 1 6 prohibit paying (or receiv-
ing payment) for the assistance of governmental officials at all levels, and pro-
hibit government employees from personal and substantial participation in a
"particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, part-
ner, organization in which he is serving . . . or any person or organization with
whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employ-
ment, has a financial interest." 27 The limitation of disqualification to present,
26. 18 U.S.C. ch. 11 (1976).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1976). Section 208 applies only to executive branch, independent agency,
or District of Columbia employees, but like constraints govern the judiciary and the legislative
branch. See, e.g., Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 1, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. Sen. rule XLV, § 8 (1977).
Although the reference to "particular matter" could be taken to exclude the application even of
this limited provision to rulemaking, § 208 is generally understood to apply to rulemaking as well as
adjudication or contract or grant activities. Other sections in Chapter 11, notably 18 U.S.C. § 207,
treating the disqualification of former officers and employees, refer to "particular matter involving a
specific party or parties." The absence of the "specific party or parties" qualification in § 208 is
generally taken to signal its application to rulemaking. S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48
(1977). A view that the reference to "a specific party or parties" was not intended to suggest any
1980]
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financial interests is striking; not only is no disqualification imposed where the
specified ties have been broken, but a Nuclear Regulatory Commission employee
may remain an officer of the Sierra Club or the Business Roundtable, or seek
employment with the Union of Concerned Scientists, without violating the Act.2 8
The rules of both houses of the Congress make similarly limited judgments
about disqualification. A member who has a "direct personal or pecuniary in-
terest" is excused from voting-but the rules stress the need for a uniquely
personal impact. Thus, members of the House who held New York State or City
bonds were not disqualified to vote on a measure authorizing emergency guaran-
tees of state obligations; their possible interest in the outcome was broadly
shared in the community at large . 2 9  Senate conflict of interest rules on voting
apply only to legislation principally aimed at furthering the pecuniary interest of
the Senator personally, his family, or a limited class of persons to which he
belongs. Employees of Senate committees are directed only to divest themselves
of any substantial holdings that may be "directly affected by the actions of the
committee" for which they work, and that only if they earn more than $25,000
annually and work more than ninety days.3 0 Other than financial disclosure
rules, criminal restraints on bribery, and occasional sensitivity about focused
serving of self-interest, few limits are imposed on a congressman's use of his
considerable authority.
Recent events provoking public interest in the probity of governmental offi-
cials, most notably the Watergate scandal, have prompted fresh examinations of
the conflict of interest problem. The resulting new standards, however, fit the
established pattern; they have been almost entirely limited to issues of financial
self-interest. The Ethics in Government Act of 197831 provides intimately for
the filing of reports about financial interests and institutional responsibilities, and
creates a new bureaucratic mechanism to administer federal conflict of interest
standards, but makes essentially no change in the legislative statement of those
standards. As distinct from continuing personal or financial interests, the knowl-
edge or attitudes an individual brings to government still are not an apparent
matter for ethical or oversight concern.3 2
difference between the sections is expressed in Jordan, Ethical Issues Arising from Present or Past
Government Service, in ABA, Professional Responsibility 177 n.21 (1978). In Mr. Jordan's view,
however, neither § 207 nor § 208 applies to general rulemaking.
28. Agency and judicial practice has occasionally been more demanding. Thus, the Internal
Revenue Service has regarded religious scruples as disqualifying individuals from participating in
determining the exempt status of an organization involved in abortion. And a commissioner of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was held to have erred in participating in an agency
rulemaking, where she was considering taking a nonpaying position with a women's rights organiza-
tion that had declared its stand on the issue she was to vote upon. Air Transp. Ass'n v, Hemandez,
264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
29. See H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 313 (1979) (rule VIII); 121 Cong. Rec.
38,135 (1975); see also ANA, slip op. at 28 n.9 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
30. Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 1, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., rule XLV, § 8 (1977) (effective
April 1, 1978).
31. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified in part at 5 U.S.C. App.).
32. In its provisions governing the conduct of former employees after leaving government serv-
ice, the Ethics in Government Act is principally limited to matters "involving a specific party or
parties," not rulemaking. Participation in rulemaking activities is affected only by new 18 U.S.C. §
[Vol. 80:990
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Contemporary standards of the legal profession also suggest few occasions for
disqualification in legislative or policy making activities (as distinct from matters
involving "a particular party or parties"), although a trend toward recognizing a
need for disqualification may exist. Thus, disciplinary rule 9-101(B) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall not accept private
employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a
government employee," but the current ABA interpretation of this phrase
excludes rulemaking:
[W]ork as a government employee in drafting, enforcing, or interpret-
ing government ... regulations ... does not disqualify the lawyer
under D.R. 9-101(B) from subsequent private employment involving
the same regulations . . .; the same "matter" is not involved because
there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transactions or conduct involv-
ing a particular situation and specific parties.3 3
This reading, which has been strongly criticized,3 4 does not obviate the possibil-
ity that a lawyer would be disqualified for a different reason-that a particular
controversy might require or appear to require him to violate the confidences of
his former (government) client, contrary to canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As now written, the Code imposes no explicit disqualification on
the government lawyer who comes from private practice, beyond the obligation
to preserve a former client's confidences. 35
207(c), which applies to former holders of significant decisionmaking or supervisory
responsibilities-at least the GS-17 level-and prohibits for one year their personal efforts to influ-
ence determinations of or substantially affecting their former agencies. The obvious concern of this
provision, which applies to all matters before or affecting the agency, is with misuse of the influence
or friendships acquired in a former position of authority. A matter need have been neither pending
nor included within the former civil servant's responsibility or personal work docket to fall within the
ban of § 207(c). At the end of a year, § 207(c)'s prohibition on advocacy ceases; and during that
year the former civil servant may freely advise new colleagues respecting their own appearances.
33. ABA Formal Op. No. 342, 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 519 (1976).
34. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Op. No. 889, 31 The Record 552, 557-58 (1976); Jordan, supra note 27, at 194-97. The
criticisms nonetheless recognize the practical difficulties inherent in an approach that might seem to
bar a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, say, from future tax consultations for any client,
and apparently would accept the District of Columbia Bar proposal discussed in note 35 infra as an
appropriate means for dealing with the problem.
35. This obligation is routinely observed by government attorneys, who may give standard in-
structions that they are not to be consulted on matters particularly concerning the interests of a former
client. Typically, although not invariably, these instructions are limited to "particular matters" (i.e.,
adjudications, rulings, etc.) in which a former client or law firm is involved, and government lawyers
do not refrain from participation in rulemaking because they learned facts in private practice possibly
bearing on the outcome. Disqualifying oneself from a rulemaking in which a lawyer or his firm has
been an active participant or (particularly) initiator appears to be regarded as the better practice by
those agencies considering the matter.
Recent proposals by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar, made after long
and intensive debate, would impose certain disqualifications respecting rulemaking, but are strikingly
limited in their application to general policymaking activities. Final Report of the Legal Ethics Com-
mittee, 3 Dist. L. 44 (Aug.-Sept. 1978). Although new public employees would have to disqualify
themselves permanently from any "matter" in which they "participated personally and substantially
while in private practice or employment," and for one year from "matters" involving recent former
clients or law associates, the proposal established no explicit restriction on an entering government
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B. Conflict of Interest Disqualification in Agency Rulemaking
1. Current Practice. The current regime for conflict of interest regulation in
the civil service owes its shape to Executive Order 11,222, promulgated during
the Johnson administration, and the implementing Office of Personnel Manage-
ment regulations.3 6 Under these rules, all federal agencies are obliged to have
in place regulations governing employee responsibilities and conduct. These reg-
ulations are generally understood to be concerned with conflicts of interest as
distinct from prejudgment as such. They set out in rich detail the financial hold-
ings and outside employment permissible for government employees and (as to
the first) their immediate families; to enforce these constraints, high level
employees file annual reports for review by agency counsellors. Originally con-
fidential, the reports of senior employees are now available to the public, under
the Ethics in Government Act. 3 7  On the basis of the reports, and following
procedures provided for in varying detail, apparent conflicts are identified and
remedies, including disqualifications, are worked out.
Some universal characteristics may be listed, few surprising and most re-
flecting the criminal provisions already discussed. An employee may not partici-
pate in a matter in which he or an immediate family member holds a financial
interest, unless by rule or special determination the interest has been found so
slight as to be waivable. He may not participate in a matter involving one with
whom he is negotiating for possible future employment or accept outside
employment that could cause conflicts with his government position. The proce-
dures provided for enforcing these constraints are internal, arising either from the
employee's identification of a problem or from the process of reviewing the
annual statements. The rules are designed to pick up financial interests and as-
sociational interests of a commercial or financial character. Political, religious,
or civic associations need not be reported; activities on behalf of such organiza-
tions are outside the "other employment" constraints. Neither the Executive
Order model nor the rules of most agencies deal with possible conflicts arising
out of prior employment, or provide for a "cooling off" period during the first
years of government service.
In responding to an Administrative Conference inquiry in connection with
this study, agencies generally agreed that conflict of interest rules, in the usual
limited sense connoting present financial or associational conflicts, apply in
rulemaking as in other forms of agency action. The statutory provisions and the
counsel's participation in rulemaking of general applicability. For counsel leaving government office,
it proposed a five-year moratorium on counselling or representation with respect to the adoption or
validity of any rule which counsel participated "personally and substantially" in drafting, proposing,
or adopting. See generally Opinions 71 and 78 of Committee on Legal Ethics of the District of
Columbia Bar (June 26 & Nov. 20, 1979). Even were the broader prohibitions on participation in
"matters" thought to apply, these prohibitions stem from client relationships and work associations,
not prior opportunity to acquire knowledge or formulate views that might be relevant to the proposals
under examination. On April 17, 1980, the D.C. Court of Appeals issued proposed rules that did not
include these proposals. Legal Times of Wash., Apr. 28, 1980, at 8.
36. 3 C.F.R. § 130 (Supp. 1965); 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201-735.210, 735.401-735.412 (1980).
37. 5 U.S.C. App. (Supp. II 1978); implementing OPM regulations are at 5 C.F.R. §§
735.501-735.508 (1980).
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Executive Order can be read to take in all forms of governmental action; the
public would expect its servants to be free of self-serving in policymaking con-
texts as much as in other forms of administration. There would seem, then, little
reason to pause over applying core conflict of interest precepts to rulemaking
activity.
Nonetheless, a very few agencies appear to regard the provisions for dis-
qualification from particular matters as not reaching general rulemaking. 38 Other
agencies treat any possible concern as answered by the increasingly common flat
prohibitions on any ownership of stock in regulated companies. Although the flat
prohibitions present the most egregious conflicts, policymaking of a general
character may well have significant, but often hard to anticipate, effects on a
broader range of financial interests-and the prohibitions divert attention from
these effects. Thus, an employee of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
much more likely to understand and accept that he cannot own stock in
Warner-Lambert, a regulated producer of veterinary medicine, than that his own-
ership of part interest in an unregulated beef feed lot precludes participation in a
general rulemaking concerning quality standards for animal food additives.
As a technical matter, the conflict of interest provisions do apply to this
situation. The Department of Justice, in response to an FDA inquiry, was clear
that 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) would reach an investor in feedlot operations who par-
ticipated in an advisory committee's deliberations about continued use of antibio-
tics in animal feed to avoid illness and promote growth; the section "applies to
any discrete or identifiable decision or recommendation, or other matter even
though its outcome may have a rather broad impact .... A benefit conferred on
an industry generally can be as much of a boon to a firm within that industry as
a competitor's going out of business." 19 As the Department noted, the statute
provides a mechanism for dealing with de minimis situations-published waiver
either in the individual case or by general rule if it can be concluded that a given
interest could not affect the integrity of employee services in any context. And,
it thought, disqualification could not be imposed for an outcome that affected the
firm "merely as a member of the general public or as part of the entire business
community."
Yet not inconsiderable arguments favor the more limited approach of simply
banning holdings in regulated industries. To put employees at peril of anticipat-
ing the side effects of rules, or even of knowing the roster of those volunteering
at various times their comments in a rulemaking, is to impose a greater burden
than that of staying aware of the parties in a discrete proceeding; and is to
impose that burden without substantial gains for effective government as a
38. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 1010.302(a)(l)(ii) (1979) ("particular matter" defined to exclude
rulemaking) (Dep't of Energy); 39 C.F.R. § 3000.735-302(c)(2) (1979) (same; Postal Rate Comm'n);
17 C.F.R. § 200.60 (1979) (SEC). The regulations of the Department of Transportation, unusually
full in this respect, state that the test of an "other particular matter" is whether the employee's
participation "will have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interest referred to . ... "
-[T]he words . . . do not necessarily include rule making of wide applicability, the formulation of
general policy or standards, or similar matters of broad scope." 49 C.F.R. § 99.735-15(c) (1979).
39. Letter from Ass't Att'y Gen. John Harmon to Richard Cooper, Chief Counsel, FDA, dated
June 29, 1978, at 4, 8.
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balancing factor. In general rulemaking, the very fact that impacts are diffuse
and often unpredictable suggests less need to guard against their warping influ-
ence. The diffuseness also means that disqualification would produce greater in-
hibitions on employee investment-a freedom significant to them. Finally, what
rises above a de minimis level for concern in this setting-an interest to be
compared with, say, the consumer interest in food prices and quality-is hard to
identify from the public's perspective.
The area of possible dispute here could be refrained in policy terms: would
it be appropriate for an agency to provide by rule that employee investments
likely to be affected by, but not directly subject to or benefiting from proposed
regulation, are deemed insufficiently substantial to affect the integrity of
employee services? 40 If the risk of unseemliness in such a rule is excessive,
might the agency set a relatively high level of total investment, beneath which
the risk is regarded as de minimis? An agency might, for example, subject an
employee to disqualification in rulemaking only if his investments were (a) in a
corporation to be subject to the proposed rule or its immediate beneficiary, or (b)
in a corporation likely to be affected by the regulation in a manner substantially
distinct from the public or business community at large and exceeded $25,000 in
value. Unless we are at the point of limiting government employee investments
to general mutual funds and like ventures, some such accommodation seems
required; that accommodation would be entirely consistent with-indeed more
demanding than-constraints currently observed in Congress and among its
staff, and apparent general practice.
2. "Cooling Off" Periods? Conflict of interest disqualification is generally
limited to present conflicts, making no provision for the impact of prior associa-
tions once ended. Section 207 of the Criminal Code, as amended by section 501
of the Ethics in Government Act, provides for certain post-employment restric-
tions; the more stringent of these apply only to "particular matter[s] involving a
specific party or parties"-not general rulemaking-but high level employees
are forbidden to seek to influence any matter before their former agencies, in-
cluding rulemaking, for one year after leaving government office.," No similar
constraint exists on dealing with the interests of former employers while a gov-
ernment employee.
Specific instances of such constraints do exist. Under the Department of
Energy's (DOE) reorganization legislation, former employees of "energy con-
cerns" may not participate at a supervisory level for one year after leaving that
employment, in a proceeding other than general rulemaking in which their
former employer is interested. If an employee was substantially involved in or
responsible for an energy concern's participation in a proceeding, whatever its
character, during the five years before joining the Department, he may not par-
ticipate in that proceeding for one year after joining."2 The Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) 43 by rule and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
40. Compare the Department of Transportation rule, supra note 38.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (Supp. I1 1978).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7212, 7216 (Supp. 11 1978); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1010.302(b), 304(b) (1979).
43. 14 C.F.R. § 300.9-.10 (1979).
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and doubtless other agencies by practice
impose similar restraints. Guidelines adopted by the incoming Carter administra-
tion for political appointees called for recusal from particular matters in which a
recent prior employer had a substantial financial interest. 44  And for attorneys,
as earlier discussed, the rules of professional conduct prohibit participation in
"matters" on which an attorney has worked for a former client, without time
limit.
Provision at least for a cooling off period, and perhaps for permanent dis-
qualification where an employee's contact with rulemaking in private employ-
ment had been personal and substantial, would be consistent with the current
trend toward increasing separation between private and public employment, and
could help allay suspicions about the "revolving door." 45 As a general matter,
one must recognize that any such change occurs at the costs of depriving gov-
ernment of some-or possibly all-assistance by qualified and involved per-
sons, of making government employment marginally less attractive (threatening
to that extent the quality of the civil service), and of making personnel adminis-
tration marginally more expensive-as the complexities of determining who
works on what issues and the number of occasions on which relevant expertise
must be sacrificed both increase.4 6
For analytic purposes, it may be useful to separate the question of a cooling
off period from that of permanent disqualification. The latter measure is obvi-
ously more severe; it is not imposed by statute on any persons entering federal
service, and for the legal profession and post-government employment such re-
straints are clearly limited to particular matters involving a specific party or par-
ties in which the employee has substantially and personally participated. These
limitations reflect policy considerations of major importance. Disqualification
from one or several "particular matters involving a specific party or parties," as
a government employee or after government employment, reaches the heart of
concerns respecting conflict of interest, yet imposes only limited, manageable
inhibitions on present government service or future private career. The range of
disqualification is discrete, and suggests no disability to deal with political
issues-only particular disputes. One is unlikely to be dissuaded from entering
government service or discouraged from leaving it by these limited constraints,
and the government as employer is not denied all use of the employee's experi-
ence and views. Such disqualification addresses the setting that marries the
44. Ethics Statements, 35 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 56 (Jan. 8, 1977).
45. In discussing cooling off periods, we are addressing the employee who has completely and
finally severed his connection to his prior employment, should there be an expectation of return, the
employee is in a situation of present, actual conflict.
46. The difficulties of assessing these costs and the cautionary implications to be drawn from
them are well illustrated in Professor Morgan's recent study for the Conference, Appropriate Limits
on Participation in Matters Before an Agency by a Former Agency Official, (Exposure Draft) (1979),
leading to ACUS Recommendation 79-7, 45 Fed. Reg. 2309 (1980) (to be codified in I C.F.R.
305.79-7). Although the Conference had no occasion to endorse Prof. Morgan's sharply skeptical
questioning of the empirical base for post-employment restrictions or his observation that analogous
restrictions arising from pre-employment activities should be observed, the tone of the recommenda-
tion suggests basic agreement with him. See also R. Vaughn, Conflict-of-Interest Regulation in the
Federal Executive Branch (1979).
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greatest risk of conflicted loyalties with the largest chance that confidences of the
prior employer will be betrayed. Its limited range at the same time restricts the
threat to the employee's utility in his new job, and eases identification of the
settings in which it applies.
The extension of disqualification to rulemaking is seen to involve much
larger constraints, in the service of a more diffuse fear of conflict. The broadly
shared concerns of a general rulemaking proceeding do not suggest the possibil-
ity of self-dealing as sharply as do the particular issues of a proceeding involving
a limited number of specific parties. Disqualification now suggests that the gov-
ernment is deprived of experience and policy view, perhaps the very basis on
which the official was chosen; or that the individual concerned must fear far
larger inhibitions on his future career. To be sure, this is a polar contrast; in
some rulemakings the interests of a limited number of parties may be at unique
and substantial risk.47 But historically rulemaking has been viewed as an activ-
ity distinct from the decision of particular, concrete controversy. If one accepts
the contemporary judgment that permanent disqualification from participation in
general rulemaking is not warranted for the former government employee, then
permanent disqualification is also unwarranted in such circumstances for the new
government employee. The practical judgment of the past has been that these
dangers are too diffuse to support, even for professionals pledged to honor a
client's confidences, the very large inhibitions on government choice and
employee mobility that would result from general disqualification.
This conclusion does not eliminate the risk of conflicted loyalty or betrayed
confidence for the employee who switches camps in the midst of a
rulemaking-even one not directly involved in the rulemaking in his former
employment. The impact of disqualification in such circumstances may be re-
duced while still attempting some control over the risk by limiting the duration
of disqualification rather than the occasions for it. This appears to be the judg-
ment reflected in the "cooling off periods" in place at the DOE and CAB.
At least three approaches are possible for a "cooling off period" disqualifi-
cation. First, as the government now imposes on former high level employees,
temporary disqualification could extend to all dealings "on the merits" with the
former employer. A second approach, the CAB formula, would preclude
employees from working on any matter that was within their official responsibil-
ity while in private employ, including rulemaking. The third approach is that
embodied in the DOE legislation: a supervisory employee may not act for a time
in any matter in which his former employer is interested, other than general
rulemaking, or in any matter in which he participated. Each of these formulas
embodies compromises reflecting the costs to government of inhibiting job mo-
bility for its present and future employees. In two cases, the restriction is limited
to the higher levels of the bureaucratic structure.48 Permission is not withheld
47. The spectrum of possibilities, and the difficulty of drawing appropriate distinctions, is simi-
lar to that which the Administrative Conference has already faced in connection with its analysis of
Home Box Office, see note 23 supra.
48. Individuals holding these positions, it might be thought, have the greatest degree of influ-
ence over the outcome of government deliberations, and the greatest job mobility even in the face of
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to advise one's new employer under the Ethics in Government Act or to partici-
pate in rulemaking at the DOE or in matters outside former responsibilities at the
CAB; each formulation preserves the possibility of acting in some circumstances
even though the former employer's interests are involved. One need not choose
among the formulations to note that an absolute cooling off period applicable to
every employee would exceed any contemporary judgment of sound practice.
Of particular interest for these purposes is the exemption under the Depart-
ment of Energy Act for participation in general rulemaking. The FCC reports
that its more informal practice is similar: in a general rulemaking in which a
former employer is one of several participants, commenting as it ordinarily
would on a matter of interest to it, a new FCC employee need not withdraw
unless he himself was involved in the development of the former employer's
position. If the former employer's interests are more directly at stake, then with-
drawal is expected. Viewed from the perspective of impact on the former
employer, of course, neither the numbers involved nor the generality of the prin-
ciple proposed necessarily reduces its stake in the outcome. It may still stand to
gain or lose mightily, and to that extent the possibility of conflicted loyalties
may still appear to advise caution. The FCC practice has overtones of a different
consideration: that where the comments may fairly be regarded as "routine," the
employee need not withdraw; where the stake is special (even if large numbers
may be involved), he must. Such consideration would tend to keep the risk of
conflicted loyalties in check; but it is not clearly the practice at the FCC, and is
not the requirement applicable at the DOE.
The rulemaking exception, it may be inferred, comes as much from the
character and needs of rulemaking as from assessment of the risks of conflict.
Several of the responding agencies, discussing generally the need for disqualifi-
cation procedures in rulemaking, remarked that the large number of individuals
who dealt with any given proceeding was itself a safeguard of objectivity in the
process. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, one could believe that
in the setting of general policy an agency has the greatest need to exercise its
entire intellectual structure. The institutional process of decision depends on hav-
ing the full resources of the institution available for decision and-because the
full resources are used-is less threatened than would be a judicial process by
distortion in any particular part.
3. Redefinition of the Interests that Possibly Conflict? Present financial and
occupational conflicts are disqualifying in rulemaking and, for the short term,
past ones perhaps should be. Do these judgments extend to occupational conflicts
in which the interests of the prior or coordinate employer are not "financial" in
character? Liberalized standing rules, and with them vastly expanded participa-
tion in agency proceedings, spring from recognition that agency decisions affect
interests other than monetary ones-aesthetic, recreational, environmental, etc.
Appreciable numbers of individuals have come to government service during the
such constraints. Descending the bureaucratic ladder, it may be surmised, brings one to individuals
whose policy influence is not great, whose mobility might well be impaired by constraints on dealing
with this or that particular issue within their ordinary ken, and on whom, indeed, the government has
a greater need to rely for hard technical advice.
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present administration from organizations active in administrative litigation and
rulemaking on behalf of those interests. Some doubtless maintain their member-
ship or even officership in those organizations; if they can be regarded as
"charitable, religious, professional, social, fraternal, nonprofit educational and
recreational, public service or civic" in nature, the organizations are excepted
from the ordinary civil service prohibitions on outside employment. 49  Should
such associations be disqualifying in particular proceedings in which these or-
ganizations participate, to the extent they would be if the organizations' interests
were financial in character?
The Department of Energy statute discussed above is limited to former
"energy concern" employees, and "energy concerns" are defined to include
those regulated by the Department and their service industries, but to exclude
others who may frequently have a large apparent stake in the outcome of DOE
proceedings. This is consistent with the general focus on financial interests. But
present and former personal associations can cloud "objectivity" in other ways.
It may strike some as odd not to subject to "cooling off" the former employee
of the Oregon Public Service Commission or the Union of Concerned Scientists,
each of which may have participated vigorously in DOE proceedings and have a
substantial institutional stake in their outcome. Retaining active membership in
the Friends of the Earth may seem equally a matter of interest, if that organiza-
tion may be a party. Some agencies, the IRS for example, appear to take the
position that at least present relationships of this character are disqualifying; the
CAB rules and FCC practice appear to contain no financial interest limitation;
the lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility would recognize little difference
between for-profit and not-for-profit clients. Undoubtedly, many government of-
ficials do abstain from participation in rulemaking as well as other forms of
decision when they or a former client have been involved in the rulemaking as
private participants.
If, as in the situations just described, disqualification is limited to cir-
cumstances in which the employee himself participated in or shared responsibil-
ity for his prior employer's formulation of a position, a principled distinction
from the "financial interest" cases is hard to identify. 50 The treachery of
switching sides, the obligation to protect confidential information, the unseemli-
ness of appearing possibly to be furthering private interests under the guise of
seeking the public good, all counsel against participation. An energy concern's
49. 5 C.F.R. § 735.203(3) (1980).
50. It could be argued, for example, that Texaco employees are likely to perceive employment
issues more in economic than in ideologic terms; for employees of the Environmental Defense Fund,
the opposite may be true. If one assumes a permanent severance of the prior employment ties on
coming to a government job, the EDF employee seems if anything more likely than the Texaco
employee to experience a carry-over of his former loyalties. If one assumes that the employee im-
agines his government service as an interlude to be followed at some indefinite time by return to
prior relationships, the former Texaco employee's (hypothesized) continued attention to economic
self-interest may distort his actions or judgments; but so may the continued ideological commitments
of the former EDF employee. With formal expectations of return, of course, disqualification of both
is required.
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perception that its interests are being unfairly dealt with when its former adver-
sary participates in rulemaking seems no less warranted than the complaints the
Environmental Defense Fund might have made before the statute's enactment if
an energy concern employee had stepped through the "revolving door" into
official responsibility for or participation in a rulemaking. A "cooling off
period" in either setting would reflect a heightening of the stated standards. In
the past, rulemaking has been regarded as outside this kind of conflict of interest
concern; but if it is not, the former employee of a participant with important
financial interests in the proceeding and the former employee of a participant
with other important and legally recognized interests at stake seem comparably
situated.
Cooling off periods might have varying effects at different levels of gov-
ernment. For the civil service employee or one appointed by the agency itself,
inability to participate in particular policymaking may be an annoyance, but may
rarely threaten the overall character of his employment. For an agency head, on
the other hand, or one close to the highest levels of government, inability to
participate in any significant number of policy matters may be truly disabling, in
practical terms approximating a proscription of employment of an individual so
situated. Even on a multimember body, the considerations of diversity of view
that initially led to the selection of a multimember format will have been de-
feated unless each member is generally able to participate in important policy
affairs. Moreover, for high level employees, the processes of bringing them into
government-nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate-will
have served both as a control of ideological precommitments and as some indica-
tion that those commitments have been endorsed as appropriate at the highest
levels of the political structure. Thus, even if cooling off periods of the type here
under discussion were generally regarded as appropriate, an exception might be
made for individuals whose appointments are subject to Senate confirmation. To
make such an exception risks having a substantial appearance of questionable
conduct; policymakers called on to act in matters with which they had been
intimately connected in prior private life have often recused themselves for that
reason. Nonetheless, a formal interdiction of participation may be inappropriate.
If one turns to a government employee's outside activity while in govern-
ment employment, the correspondence between financial interests and interests
directly implicated in that activity also seems strong. Government generally dis-
claims interest in charitable, professional, civic, or other like activities of its
employees for important reasons: this minimizes intrusions on employee lives; it
recognizes and even fosters civic and religious activity; it reflects the general
unimportance of such activities to agency functioning; and it acknowledges the
unreliability of membership in an organization as an index of attachment to par-
ticular positions. Suppose, however, that proposed rulemaking by the FCC is
believed by the American Civil Liberties Union strongly to implicate its mem-
bers' interests in free speech, and thus leads to ACLU participation. If an agency
employee is merely a member of the ACLU, that connotes little or nothing; if,
however, he is an officer of the organization, or has participated in drawing up
its comments, intuition asserts that a conflict of loyalties may arise as disabling
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as those we infer from the possibility of financial self-serving. Official responsi-
bility for the preparation of comments, or substantial and personal participation
in that activity, creates a conflict whether the interest of the commenter is finan-
cial (in which event the employee's participation is a criminal act) or is other-
wise recognized as substantial. Disqualification, it appears, should equally flow.
4. The Six Precepts of Ethical Government Employee Behavior. A basis for
even more radical extension of conflict of interest reasoning could be found in
Executive Order 11,222, which sets forth six nonbinding precepts of employee
behavior:
An employee shall avoid any action, whether or not specifically
prohibited by this subpart, which might result in, or create the appear-
ance of:
(a) Using public office for private gain;
(b) Giving preferential treatment to any person;
(c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
(d) Losing complete independence or impartiality;
(e) Making a Government decision outside official channels; or
(f) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of
the Government. 51
Like the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 208, these precepts do not distin-
guish between rulemaking and other governmental activity, and apply to all.
Agency rules generally include them, although the formulations vary greatly
from statements ostensibly binding on the employee 52 to the merely preca-
tory. 53 A number of agencies, in responding to the Conference's inquiry,
pointed to the precepts (notably (d) and (f)) as a basis for asserting that disqual-
ification could occur in rulemaking. Most acknowledged, however, that en-
forcement efforts are limited to financial conflicts and associations; and in no
agency are the procedures for enforcement adapted to identifying or responding
to situations in which "complete independence or impartiality" is lost or "the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government" is shaken. At pres-
ent, these matters are left to employee judgment, and the precepts do little more
than provide a peg on which a sensitive employee may hang his request to be
relieved of particular duties he finds uncomfortable. 54 Should conflict of in-
terest disqualification extend to every action within reach of these six precepts?
In particular, should agency heads or employees withdraw (or be required to do
so) whenever some action could appear to compromise their "complete indepen-
dence or impartiality" or to affect "adversely the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the Government"?
51. 5 C.F.R. § 735.201(a) (1980). The OPM regulations require agencies to issue regulations
embodying a number of prescribed standards, but not these. Id. § 735.201.
52. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 0.735-5 ("A violation of this part by an employee may be cause for
remedial action .... "), 0.735-11(a) (1980) (verbatim text of 5 C.F.R. § 735.201(a), supra note 58)
(Dep't of Agriculture).
53. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 1010.101(a) (1979) (DOE "expects that its employees . . . will avoid
any action .... ").
54. See, e.g., R. Vaughn, supra note 46, at 35.
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Ascribing mandatory force to the precepts would pretermit much of the pre-
ceding discussion. While in a formal sense it would remain to determine
whether, for example, cooling off periods were required to avoid loss of impar-
tiality, or whether conflict of nonfinancial interests adversely affects the confi-
dence of the public, the venue for that determination would have been shifted to
the courts. Since the precepts do not discriminate between rulemaking and other
forms of administrative activity, it could be expected that the courts would apply
them without making any such distinction. If the precepts were to be judicially
rather than self-administered, mandatory rather than hortatory, they might
quickly be found to embody premises fully as demanding and subject to the
sensitivities of observers as judicial disqualification provisions have proved to
be.
Nor do all the precepts state concerns commonly associated with "conflict
of interest" analysis. Independence, impartiality, and public confidence can be
or appear to be compromised by behavior having little association with conflict-
ing loyalties or self-serving. Dr. Bingham's speech in the lead pollution case or
Chairman Pertschuk's remarks in ANA may reasonably be characterized as parti-
san in some sense; yet neither grew out of any present or past relationship or
reflected any personal gain to be achieved. In the usual understanding-reflected
in agency practice as shown by the responses to the Conference survey-
"conflict of interest" concerns are concerns with conflict. 55 Prejudgment and
bias, which may also affect impartiality, independence, and public confidence,
are understood to be dealt with under another head. In the absence of the distor-
tions arising from associational conflict or selfish motive, partiality raises no
conflict of interest concern.
This conclusion, such as it is, is of course strictly analytical. It does not
imply either that nonconflictual partiality in rulemaking is licit or that the six
Executive Order precepts are inappropriate goals for the public service to seek or
even enforce. Those issues are the business of the next section of. this Article.
What the conclusion does suggest is that development of conflict of interest
analysis is not itself the appropriate vehicle for enforcing the precepts on gov-
ernment employees.
III. CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGES: "BIAS" AND "ANIMUS"
Conflict of interest principles represent one of three general groupings of
concern about the propriety of participation in a government decision. The other
two, prejudgment of fact (bias) and prior or irrational commitment (animus), are
commonplace concerns in adjudication for which objectivity in the decisionmaker
is central, but are foreign to agency rulemaking practice. With exceptions almost
wholly limited to conflicts of interest (broadly conceived) or on-the-record pro-
ceedings, federal agencies neither administer nor recognize a need for any sys-
tem of assessing the propriety of participation in rulemaking or policymaking.
Even where the agencies' rules do provide for disqualification of presiding offi-
55. Accord, id. at 4-6.
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cers in on-the-record rulemaking, that is most often as part of general procedural
rules for all on-the-record proceedings, adopted with adjudication in view. 56 As-
sessing the appropriateness of disqualification for bias or animus in rulemaking
requires, first, an appreciation of the adjudication model, against which contrasts
may appear. That model itself, it will quickly be seen, is not premised on the
hopeless aim of obtaining absolute objectivity in the adjudicator. A less ambiti-
ous agenda, of open-mindedness respecting the case-unique aspects of the pro-
ceeding, characterizes even judicial disqualification rules. The following pages
begin with a discussion of disqualification in strictly judicial proceedings and
then discuss the practice in agency proceedings resembling trials before moving
to consider the possible applications of this analysis to policymaking.
A. Judicial Disqualification
The requirements of impartiality commonly accepted as apt for the judicial
branch of government stand in marked contrast to those applicable in the legisla-
ture or to the general run of executive activity. Personal animus toward parties or
prejudgments respecting facts in dispute, irrelevancies for legislators and execu-
tive personnel (unless the latter happen to be regarded as quasi-judges), are well
established grounds for judicial disqualification.
Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455, set the current legislative
standards for the federal judiciary. Section 144, dealing with alleged "personal
bias or prejudice," is essentially unchanged since its enactment in 1911 ., Under
its provisions, a judge is obliged to disqualify himself on the timely filing of a
detailed and sufficient affidavit of "personal bias or prejudice," supported by
counsel's certificate of good faith; it was early established that the truth of the
matters asserted is not at issue, but only their sufficiency, if true, to establish
personal animus or prejudgment. 58 To reduce judge-shopping, counsel is lim-
ited to one such affidavit in each case.
Section 455, prior to its recent amendments, dealt exclusively with conflict
of interest disqualification. Disqualification for interest, early established at
56. The APA provision for disqualification in on-the-record proceedings, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)
(1976), governs both rulemaking and adjudication, and suggests disqualification for "personal bias"
of both "presiding employees" and "employees participating in decisions in accordance with section
557." The latter reference is apparently to "an employee qualified to preside at hearings" where the
presiding employee is unavailable, id. § 557(b), or "one of [the agency's] responsible employees" in
rulemaking or initial licensing, id. § 557(b)(1). Since the responsibilities of responsible employees in
rulemaking will often have led them into consultations forbidden to those who preside in on-the-
record adjudication, id. § 554(d)(1), with results usually described as "personal bias" in settings
where such contacts are proscribed, the application of § 556(b) to formal rulemaking can certainly
vary from that appropriate for adjudication. No suggestion of such a variation appears in the agency
rules, although it may be reflected in some agencies' practice.
57. 36 Stat. 1090 (1911).
58. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). An example of a dispute over "sufficiency"
would be whether the affidavit concerns extrajudicial events, or matters arising during the course of
judicial activities. The distorting factors asserted are required to be personal-that is to say, extraju-
dicial in origin-in the usual case; an affidavit based on the judge's participation in an earlier trial
would be regarded as insufficient to establish cause to disqualify.
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common law,5 9 had been required by statute in the Act of May 8, 1792,60 for-
bidding the sitting of federal district judges "concerned in interest" or who had
been "of counsel for either party." Amendments enacted in 1911 called upon a
judge to disqualify himself if he was "concerned in interest" in a case, had been
of counsel, had been a material witness, or was "so related to or connected with
either party as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit." 61 The
section's limited statement of principle and highly subjective test led to the con-
clusion that judges had a "duty to sit," and that in close cases the balance
should be tipped toward hearing rather than recusal. 62
Constitutional analyses of the requirements of fair procedure were equally
limited. The leading Supreme Court cases imported little more than that due
process forbade the sitting of a judge who was financially interested, directly 6 3
or indirectly, 64 in the outcome of a proceeding, or whose prior contacts with a
party were so emotionally charged as to make it appear likely that he would now
regard a pending action as his own. 65  In part, this reluctance to require disqual-
ification was grounded in important policy concerns. Although expansion of the
federal judiciary can ease the technical problems created by disqualification, the
costs, complications, and delays involved in providing substitute judges remain
substantial. Too ready disqualification invites party efforts at disqualification.
And it remains true that if
"bias" and "[im]partiality" be defined to mean the total absence of
preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a
fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no
blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the pro-
cess of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men
59. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (1610), is the decision
most often cited, but one whose principles would not have been surprising to jurists of the time. D.
Hewitt, Natural Justice 16 (1972). On the common law development, said to have been limited in
early cases to allegations of personal interest, see also Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale
L.J. 605 (1947); Note, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution,
Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 Ore. L. Rev. 311 (1969); Note, Judicial Disqualifica-
tion in the Federal Courts, 1978 U. Ill. L.F. 863, 865.
60. 1 Stat. 278 (1792).
61. 36 Stat. 1090 (1911) (emphasis added).
62. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964).
63. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
64. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
65. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), for example, reiterates the position that the combi-
nation of investigating and judging functions is not in itself a denial of due process. The Court's
several criminal contempt disqualification cases, which might have appeared to stand for the contrary
view, in fact involve an additional element-the judge is "victim" as well as "prosecutor" and
"judge" of the alleged offense, and this status makes the case far more his "own cause," which he
is not fit fairly to judge. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsyl-
vania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Similar concerns seem to
underlie the dissent in Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S.
482 (1976); the majority, following Withrow, found no constitutional difficulty in permitting a school
board that had conducted negotiations during a teacher's strike to impose sanctions on teachers par-
ticipating in the strike; the dissenters believed disqualification would be required to achieve constitu-
tional fairness if (as was not clear on the record) the board's own conduct during the strike was in
issue in any significant respect. All nine Justices agreed that simple knowledge of the circumstances
of the strike, acquired in official capacity but dehors a record, was not disqualifying.
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which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede
reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition,
are pre-judices .... Interests, points of view, preferences, are the es-
sence of living. Only death yields complete dispassionateness, for such
dispassionateness signifies utter indifference.
.. Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a
black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be
human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless
thinking machine. 66
The profession and the public were persuaded, however, to the need for
making disqualification standards more explicit by a period of extraordinary tur-
moil over judicial ethics beginning in the late 1960's. 67 Closely tracking 1972
revisions to the ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics, Congress greatly enlarged the
scope of mandatory judicial disqualification in 1974 amendments to section
455.68 The new version repudiates any "duty to sit" as a policy concern possi-
bly counterbalancing factors suggestive of recusal. The judge is to consult not
his own 1erception of what factors are disqualifying, but the perception of
reasonable members of the community.6 9 Concrete examples, not all of them
obvious, are given of circumstances in which disqualification is mandatory,
70
reaching issues of animus and prejudgment as well as an expanded domain of
personal interest issues. Particularly striking is the statement of nonwaivable
grounds for disqualification seeming to arise from prior connections that may
have been wholly intellectual in character: "personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding," 17 and, for prior government
employees, having "expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy." 72 Both of these legislative statements could be thought to
have strong implications for administrative as well as judicial behavior. Closer
examination, however, discloses few if any instances of compelled judicial dis-
qualification in the absence of some species of interest in the outcome or per-
sonal animus toward a party.
The only explanation of the "personal knowledge" clause is that "a judge
cannot be, or cannot appear to be, impartial if he has personal knowledge of
66. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.).
67. A Supreme Court Justice had been denied the Chief Justiceship and then resigned under
pressure; two Supreme Court appointments had failed of confirmation; another Justice had been
threatened with impeachment; yet another was sitting in judgment over disputes involving the United
States on which he seemed to have expressed views while acting as an Assistant Attorney General.
Scandals and partiality at lower levels of the judiciary were also in the news. The story is well told
in J. MacKenzie, The Appearance of Justice (1974).
68. Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1976): "(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned." What would be "reasonable" questioning is itself a matter in some dispute. See
Note, supra note 59, 48 Ore. L. Rev. at 311; Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or
Prejudice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236 (1978).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 455(1) (1976).
71. Id. § 455(b)(1).
72. Id. § 455(b)(3).
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evidentiary facts that are in dispute." 7 Plainly that statement is overbroad.
Judges read newspapers, and do not withdraw whenever the credibility of friends
or acquaintances may be put at issue, or when in daily life they may have had
the chance to form an impression about some matter necessary to decide-for
example, the level of noise pollution created by an airport at which the judge has
sometimes lunched. Discussion in and out of the cases uniformly refuses to find
a need for disqualification in such circumstances. 7 4  Cases identified in the most
extensive treatise treatment as supporting the "personal knowledge" proposition
all involve situations in which prior, ex parte contacts had been made by one
party to the case, thus creating an appearance of favoritism, bias, or prejudice,
as well as "prejudgment." 7 No case yet found holds that simple exposure to
controversy in the community, without more, is, enough.
A well settled and important narrowing of the statute's language is that
knowledge previously acquired in a judicial capacity is not "personal" knowl-
edge. 76  Of course such official knowledge of the facts may be equally condu-
73. Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 62 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Thode,
Reporter's Notes]. Professor Thode was reporter to the ABA's special committee, and his work is
widely regarded as important "legislative history" of the Code. Compare Rehnquist, Sense and
Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 The Record 694 (1973).
74. "The disqualification provision is directed toward knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,
that is, matters underlying the cause of action. We do not understand the statutory language to be
directed toward routine judgments of credibility. . . . Congress did not intend to disrupt the court's
business on such inadequate grounds." Plechner v. Widener College, 569 F.2d 1250, 1263 (3d Cir.
1977); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977); Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1975)
("Credibility choices are not disputed facts."); United States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641 (D.
Nev. 1978) (judge would have to have disqualified self if a juror); Town of E. Haven v. Eastern Air
Lines, 304 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Conn. 1969).
In Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa.. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976), a trial judge who had been
friendly with a murdered policeman and attended his funeral was held not to have violated canon
3C(1) by presiding at the resulting homicide trial. While one may believe here, with Professor
Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 395,
402-03 [hereinafter cited as Thode, Code of Judicial Conduct], that the dissent in the case has more
merit, surely that is because the threat of partiality has crept in along with that of prior exposure to
"fact." As in the criminal contempt cases, see note 65 supra, there is reason to fear the case has
become the judge's own. Putting critical reaction aside, however, the fact of this decision confirms
the test: "personal knowledge of the facts" may refer to what is known by a potential material
witness, or what results from inappropriate contact by a party (suggestive of favoritism); it does not
refer merely to acquaintance with versions of the facts acquired through ordinary life in the commu-
nity.
75. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3543 (1975).
76. The cases are collected and discussed at id. § 3542 nn. 10-14. An excellent, illustrative,
and frequently cited example is In re Fed. Facilities Realty Trust, 140 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. III. 1956).
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). At some point a reviewing court
may be convinced that the trial court has become so emotionally involved with one side or the other
as to foreclose necessary detachment. See, e.g., Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152 (6th
Cir. 1979); Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F. 2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). Such cases seem to be
characterized by intemperance of expression toward one side or by evident emotionality beyond
simple disbelief, and expressions in the opinions make one suspect that the reviewing judges believe
the sitting judge to be often unjudicial in mien. They may also be cases involving the need to
administer a remedy, or other circumstances that force the judge to deal with the parties and assess
their good faith over relatively long periods of time. Once a judge is drawn to question the good faith
of a party he has, of necessity, failed to remain "detached from the conflict between the parties."
Id. at 186. See generally Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53-56 (1979).
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cive to prejudgment or, where a party is abrasive, animus. Judges make prelimi-
nary determinations before trial that inevitably shape their view of the facts to be
proved-in criminal cases (e.g., probable cause hearings) as well as during civil
discovery and pretrial conference; in ex parte (on applications for warrants and
temporary restraining orders) as well as in bilateral proceedings. They try again
cases in which they have been reversed on appeal; pass on motions for postcon-
viction relief or parole revocation in cases in which they earlier convicted the
party in crime. But these prejudgments are not disqualifying, as United States v.
Wolfson"l illustrates. Wolfson wished to disqualify District Judge Palmieri from
passing on his application for postconviction relief. Wolfson had twice been a
defendant before the judge, had unpleasant exchanges with him during and after
the trials, and subsequently sent him unfriendly communications. The cir-
cumstances did not suffice to disqualify the judge. Personal bias, the Second
Circuit stated, "must stem from an extra-judicial source"; 78 the letter and tele-
gram Wolfson had sent may have shown his feelings toward the judge, but not
the reverse.
At one level, the refusal to find prior judicial exposure disqualifying repre-
sents an accommodation to the needs of a busy judicial system; at another, a
safeguard against the manipulation that could occur if a defendant-or any party
who began to see the wind blowing against him-could secure recusal by out-
rageous behavior or by pointing out the judgment in the process of formation.
"If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas
called trials, he could never render decisions." 79 Equally important, however,
is the perception that these prejudgments, officially rather than "personally"
reached, do not compromise the deciding officer. Because these judgments are
professional ones, they are thought not to produce or threaten the same level of
psychological commitment to outcome as would more personal involvements.
The judges may be "assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual disci-
pline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances." 80
Knowledge of "disputed evidentiary facts" refers not only to knowledge
acquired in a certain way, but also to "facts" of a directly testimonial and
case-unique character. We have already suggested the distinction between the
questions whether Jones was fired on account of race, and whether segregated
education is harmful to the development of children. The latter question does
raise factual issues, issues on which testimony and dispute can readily be im-
agined; but no particular observable events are uniquely central to that testimony,
and resolution of those issues has a significance stretching well beyond the par-
ticular case in which they may be presented. The use of judicial notice, of "fac-
tual" advocacy based on materials never placed on record at a trial, has long
77. 558 F.2d 59 (2d. Cir. 1977); accord, In re Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923
(1980).
78. 558 F.2d at 62.
79. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1943).
80. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941). See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975).
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been tolerated, and no case suggests that disqualification would be appropriate
when it has occurred. 8 1 Thus, it is not sufficient that a given matter is suscepti-
ble of evidentiary dispute; prior exposure to "facts" has seemed important to
disqualification in ,the judicial context only where the facts in question are unique
to the parties, requiring, not merely permitting, testimony for their elucidation
and resolution.
The distinction thus suggested is essentially Professor Davis's oft-referred-to
distinction between "legislative" and "adjudicative" fact. While, prior to the
decision in ANA, no court or legislature seems to have referred to it in discussing
judicial disqualification, the distinction was central to consideration of the
closely related issue of judicial notice. 82 Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence now places constraints on the use of judicial notice-in other words,
requires trial-only for matters of "adjudicative fact" as Professor Davis has
defined them--"the facts of the particular case," those "which relate to the
parties," as distinct from those "which have relevance to legal reasoning and the
lawmaking process," such as whether adverse testimony given in criminal pro-
ceedings by one spouse against another would be likely to destroy almost any
marriage.1 3  If the dispute is one readily submitted, in our traditions, to legisla-
tive resolution, then the underlying factual questions do not come within the
reach of the formal constraints on judicial notice established by rule 201, how-
ever possible or even desirable it may be to resolve that dispute when it arises in
a trial by evidence subject to cross-examination. 84  Nor, so far as can be deter-
81. Accord, Note, Bias in Administrative Rulemaking After Association of National Advertisers
v. FTC, 54 Notre Dame Law. 886, 895-98 (1979); but compare ANA, slip op. at 34-35 n.ll (Mac-
Kinnon, J., dissenting).
82. Judicial notice rules, like ex pane contact rules and disqualification rules in the context here
under discussion, are concerned with how judges acquire information, the necessary relation of the
parties to that process, and the control by the parties of it. Rules respecting judicial notice and ex
parte contact, however, usually provide a much milder remedy (notice and opportunity to respond)
than bias rules, for which the remedy is disqualification. See, e.g., J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence 200-18 (1979). Only in extreme cases are ex parte contacts apparently thought
to require disqualification as a remedy; no judicial notice error has been found which led a court to
impose that sanction on the noticing judge. Cf. Fox v. City of W. Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1967) (judge noticed highly disputable facts about land character on the basis of prior personal
ownership of similar land; reversed for retrial, apparently before same judge). In the absence of a
personal stake, it appears to be assumed that the judge, informed of his error, will be fully capable of
an impartial retrial. If taking judicial notice of a given fact is not error-or if error, is readily
corrected by affording an opportunity for responsive demonstration- having "personal knowledge"
of the same material can hardly be, without more, sufficient ground for the more extreme step of
disqualification.
83. See Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 201(a).
84. The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is not, as litigators sometimes
assert it to be, one between matters susceptible of evidentiary proof at a trial and those that are not.
One can imagine experts testifying richly about the impact of spousal testimony on marriage survival,
and vigorous cross-examination of them respecting their views and the experimental basis on which
they rest. Nor do the comments on rule 201 deny that a judge required to decide some controverted
issue of legislative fact may sometimes find it advisable to use the medium of trial-type procedure.
Unconstrained judicial notice is not always desirable for "legislative facts." But those who drafted
rule 201 were unable to formulate a general principle that would not be too constraining on judicial
disposition of these more general issues, issues not unique to the parties and to the particular cir-
cumstances of the litigation. Compare the discussion of similar difficulties in connection with Con-
gress's adoption of the Magnuson-Moss Act in the majority's opinion in the ANA case, slip op. at
19801 1015
1016 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:990
mined, have such factual disputes ever been the occasion for disqualification of a
judge found to have "personal knowledge" of them.
Disqualification of judges for their views of policy or law presents far sim-
pler issues; the law unequivocally regards attitudes on legal or policy issues as
lying outside the perimeters of concern with bias or prejudgement.8 5 The stat-
ute, like the ABA canons on which it draws, speaks only of interest, attitude
toward a party, or extrajudicial knowledge of the "disputed evidentiary facts" as
grounds for disqualification.' 6  Although reserve in public commentary about
pending proceedings is called for in ABA canon 3A(6), that canon is limited to
the particulars of the case, and violation of it is not disqualifying. As Justice
Rehnquist remarked in a notable memorandum explaining a refusal to disqualify
himself in Laird v. Tatum,
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their mid-
dle years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated
at least some tentative notions that would influence them in their in-
terpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their in-
teraction with one another. It would be not merely unusual, but ex-
traordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to constitutional
issues in their previous legal careers. Proof that a Justice's mind at the
time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of
23-25. The majority concludes that there may be a third class of fact--"specific fact"-narrow in
focus and material to the outcome of rulemaking, yet "legislative" in character, which it is reasona-
ble to find using trial-type techniques. Its principal reliance is on legislative history deriving from the
Administrative Conference and its officers.
Rather than view the distinction from the perspective of what may be litigated one could ap-
proach it from the perspective of what can be legislated. That is, one could say that an adjudicative
fact is one that, in our traditions, cannot be fairly resolved contrary to private interest by a legislature
but requires a trial; is one that, in appropriate circumstances, would excite bill of attainder concerns;
or is one as to which, in Professor Davis's terms, we have made "the practical judgment on the basis
of experience, that taking evidence, subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, is the best way to
resolve controversies .... " K. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Conve-
nience, in Perspectives on Law 69, 93 (1964) (emphasis added).
85. While this outcome is not beyond intellectual question, see Downing, Judicial Ethics and
the Political Role of Courts, 35 L. & Contemp. Prob. 94 (1970), no one has yet suggested a practical
alternative.
86.
Subsection (a) has gone through several formulations in drafting. At one time the
language provided for disqualification if a judge "had a fixed belief concerning the
merits." It was intended that a judge disqualify himself if he had made up his mind on
the merits before he heard the case. The Committee was confronted, however, by the
interpretation of many able judges and law professors that would require a judge to
disqualify himself if he had a fixed belief about the law applicable to a given case. For
example, it was argued that a judge with a fixed belief that the First Amendment pre-
cludes a libel action by a public official against a newspaper in the absence of proof of
malice should disqualify himself in a libel case of that general character. This interpreta-
tion was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized the necessity and the value of
judges' having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many other facets of the
law. As a result of the apparent ambiguity of the proposed language, the Committee
adopted instead the standard of "personal bias or prejudice."
Thode, Reporter's Notes, supra note 73, at 61.
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constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification,
not lack of bias. 87
The circumstances of this case are instructive. While an Assistant Attorney
General, the Justice had appeared before Senate committees as a witness on the
legal issues involved in the case, and had twice had to refer to the case itself-
then pending in lower courts-although in respects not at issue before the Su-
preme Court. In adopting section 455, Congress revised the ABA canon in a
way that might seem a direct response to Justice Rehnquist's refusal to with-
draw. A former government attorney must disqualify himself, it provided, not
only when he has acted as counsel, adviser, or material witness in the case, but
also where he has "expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy." 88 This might be thought a repudiation of the established
view, making a judge's expression of policy or legal views during a prior period
of government service a ground for disqualification.
No such intent is expressed by the legislative history, however; it refers to
Justice Rehnquist's memorandum but gives no indication whether he is thought
to have been right or wrong in his decision to participate. A close analysis of the
problem of disqualification of former government attorneys, relied on in part by
Justice Rehnquist, reached the historical conclusion that "Justices disqualify in
government cases when they have been directly involved in some fashion in the
particular matter, and not otherwise . . . [and] do not disqualify merely because
the particular matter involves a policy which, when in the government, they may
have helped to form." 89 The language of section 455 is consistent with this
practice, if "the merits of the particular case" is understood to refer to the
outcome of the case between the parties, on its unique facts, and not to the
outcome of any legal questions involved. The ethical ill to which the subsection
is addressed appears to be one of animus rather than intellectual
predisposition-that the judge has committed himself personally to one of the
contending parties, rather than that he has views about the appropriate rule of
law to be applied. So viewed, the statute adopts a rule comparable to that which
precludes a judge from participating in appellate review of his own trial deci-
sions, but permits him to review other cases involving identical legal or policy
issues. The application of this provision to Justice Rehnquist's sitting in Laird v.
Tatum is at best controversial; 90 but prior general legal or policy views remain
firmly nondisqualifying.
87. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835-39 (1972). Justice Rehnquist also reviews at length the
history of practice by Supreme Court Justices, a history in which labor partisan Frankfurter did not
hesitate to sit on cases involving disputes over the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which he
helped to draft; and former Senator Black sat to assess the constitutionality of legislation he had
championed in the Senate.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (1976).
89. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 L. & Contemp. Prob. 43,
50 (1970).
90. In their treatise on federal civil procedure, supra note 75, Professors Wright, Miller, and
Cooper at first concluded that this must be disqualifying; they subsequently recanted that view,
remarking that the Justice's testimony, as relevant to the issues before the Court, dealt only with
general propositions of law. Compare id. § 3544 n.7 with id. (Supp. 1980). But see Thode, Code of
Judicial Conduct, supra note 74, at 403 n.36.
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B. Administrative Disqualification in On-The-Record Proceedings
1. Statutory Provisions. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that in
any on-the-record proceeding:
A presiding or participating employee may at any time disqualify him-
self. On the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of
personal bias or other disqualification of a presiding or participating
employee, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record
and decision in the case.9 1
This language does not embody the detailed provisions of 28 U.S.C. section
455, although they may be looked to f'or guidance. As important for present
purposes, what may be disqualifying is limited by the implications of the Act's
more specific provisions respecting internal separation of functions. 2  These
provisions limit the kinds of conversations agency decisionmakers may have with
fellow employees in on-the-record proceedings, limitations equally concerned
with preserving the conditions necessary for objective decisionmaking. But these
provisions are strikingly limited in their application. "An employee or agent
engaged in the performance of investigative . . . functions" may "participate or
advise in the decision" of an on-the-record rulemaking, initial licensing, or
ratemaking. To this extent, prior associations that today would plainly be re-
garded as disqualifying in a judicial context are not made disqualifying in on-
the-record rulemaking, licensing, or ratemaking.93 For agency members them-
selves, disqualification is apparently never required for prior performance of of-
ficial functions that a judge might regard as inconsistent with their agency role.
The legislative history of the APA provisions strongly suggests that the
drafters' concerns were with the personal animosities and commitments arising
from an investigator's or prosecutor's active pursuit of a particular adversary,
and not with intellectual commitments arising out of prior consideration of an
asserted fact. Thus, in discussing the need for separation of adjudicatory function
from investigating and prosecuting, the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Committee carefully draws a line between those who actually investigate and
prosecute and those who make the intellectual assessment whether on a given set
of asserted facts a prosecution should be brought. The former suffers the "per-
sonal psychological" disqualification of having so "buried himself in one side of
an issue [that he is] disabled from bringing to its decision that dispassionate
judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands"; the. latter- generally in-
cluding the agency head-need make no such commitment to the asserted
91. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976).
92. Id. § 554(d).
93. Regulatory reform proposals pending before Congress would eliminate this distinction. See
S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. At
this point, however, the purpose is not so much to defend the distinction, which is widely regarded
as unfair for proceedings required to be decided on the record, as to illustrate by resort to existing
legal doctrine what has been the agreement on application of disqualification principles to administra-
tive practice. The pending proposals would not apply to informal ratemakings. See also note 19
supra, discussing recent changes made by the FTC Improvements Act of 1980.
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facts." The reports in both houses of Congress refer to "accusatory" proceed-
ings as the ones for which this separation of functions is required. 95 Perhaps
most telling in this respect is the discussion in the Attorney General's Manual on
the APA, 96 which identifies the presence of "accusatory or disciplinary factors"
as a necessary condition of applying the separation of functions requirement. The
"personal psychological" commitment of investigators or prosecutors vis-a-vis
particular individuals would not, in the Attorney General's view, disqualify them
from assisting in the decision of cases involving other persons "merely because
the facts of [the latter case] may form a pattern similar to those which they had
heretofore investigated or prosecuted"; identity of parties was the disqualifying
element. 97  Although a general counsel could not fairly advise the agency how
to decide an accusatory proceeding in which he had been substantially involved,
his "participation in rule making and in court litigation would be entirely com-
patible with his role in advising the agency in the decision of adjudicatory
cases." 9s Actual commitment to one side in a particular accusatory or discipli-
nary battle, not simple exposure to factual materials, thus appears to have been
the principal concern. 99
2. The Supreme Court Cases. The decisions of the Supreme Court, some
already briefly discussed, 100 suggest that even in accusatory proceedings, involv-
ing specific parties and directed to the imposition of a sanction, mandatory dis-
94. S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1941). Practical considerations also are important:
the individuals who actually investigate and prosecute can be separated from the decisional function
without significant impairment of efficiency. But policy decisions respecting the initiation of actions
cannot readily be separated from assessing the results of those actions.
95. Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24-25 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1945) (agencies are advised not to
apply the exceptions in ratemaking or licensing cases that prove to be "accusatory in form and
involve sharply controverted factual issues," for the exceptions are not meant to preclude "fair
procedure where it is required"); H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The Senate
Judiciary Committee print would specifically have required disqualification where there had been a
willful breach of separation of functions by a hearing officer, but that provision did not emerge from
committee. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946) at 29.
96. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
51-58 (1947).
97. Id. at 54 n.6. See also Jonal Corp. v. District of Columbia, 533 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
98. Attorney General's Manual, supra note 96, at 58 n.8. Cf. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC,
589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979), in which Commissioner Collier was disqualified in the Commission's
proceeding against American General for having previously served as counsel in a related court of
appeals proceeding. Had he previously appeared as an advocate before the Commission in the case,
his disqualification would have been required by uniform judicial practice, § 455, and prior deci-
sions, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But the appearance here
was on review of the Commission's judgment; as the Commission's attorney, Collier was bound to
take no position other than its own; if he thus became "committed" to a particular outcome, it is
hard to understand why his commitment should be regarded as greater or more prejudicial than that
of the commissioners whose judgment he defended. Those commissioners, of course, remained free
to decide the issue. This line of analysis was not discussed by the court.
99. There appears to have been no direct consideration of what was meant by disqualifying
bias, it. presumably being understood that prevailing judicial norms would be applied. These were
permissive, as has-already been remarked. See, e.g., NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219
(1947). :
100. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
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qualification requires a distinctly personal interest (whether financial or emo-
tional) in the outcome of the particular case. When the Secretary of Agriculture
reacted with strong emotion to Supreme Court decisions adverse to him in the
famous Morgan litigation,101 the fact "that he not merely held, but expressed,
strong views on matters believed by him to have been in issue, did not unfit him
for exercising his duties in subsequent proceedings ordered by this Court." 102
The views expressed had neither impugned the parties nor concerned any particu-
lar facts he had to decide respecting them.
Similarly, in a proceeding seeking to impose the sanction of a cease and
desist order, it was not disqualifying that members of the FTC had engaged in an
ex parte study of the very practices engaged in by the defendants in the proceed-
ing and had reported to Congress their view that the practices were in violation
of the law. The case, FTC v. Cement Institute, 10 3 is frequently discussed as if it
involved precommitments of a policy nature only, but the Court assumed that
those views were based on the investigation's results-i.e., on prior exposure to
fact. "[T]hat the Commission had entertained such views ...did not necessar-
ily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed . . . ." The
prior exposure was official and unrelated to any particular party or case-of a
piece with Congress's purpose to permit commissioners " 'to acquire the expert-
ness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from
experience.' "104 To be contrasted was the decision in Tumey v. Ohio, 105
where there had been a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reach-
ing his conclusion to convict." 106
The absence of a "personal psychological" commitment, as distinct from a
commitment ascribable to the performance of official function, was also central
to the Court's refusal to find disqualifying bias in Withrow v. Larkin. 0 7 That
case involved a state medical board responsible both for selecting professional
discipline cases for prosecution and for deciding those not referred to criminal
prosecution. This combination of functions, it was argued, offended constitu-
tional requirements of fair procedure. The Court rejected the argument. It iden-
tified "cases ... in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest ...and in
101. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
102. Id. at 421.
Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be
flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an underlying philosophy in
approaching a speciric case. But both are assumed to be men of conscience and intellec-
tual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances.
Id.
103. 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948).
104. Id. at 702 (citing Report of Comm. on Interstate Commerce No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
10-11 (1914)).
105. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
106. The Court also relied upon the absurdity that would result from disqualification of the
entire Commission-in effect, the doctrine of necessity. It may be noted, however, that this concern
was expressed as only an alternative ground of decision, and that "necessity" has not prevented the
Court from disqualifying an entire tribunal where substantial personal interests of its members so
require. Id.; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
107. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See note 65 supra.
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which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before
him" as presenting too high a probability of actual bias to be constitutionally
tolerable. But it concluded that "a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies
and human weakness" did not require the same conclusion for the combination
of investigative with adjudicatory function; the prior exposure to adjudicatory
fact which follows from that combination did not imply an incapacity for objec-
tivity on the.record. 108
The distinction parallels that already encountered for judicial disqualification
between prior personal (extrajudicial) contact with a case and prior official con-
tact. Where the decider has acted officially, he is presumed to be able to over-
come his prior inclinations, knowledge, or conclusions; it is prior personal in-
volvement that produces irrational attachment to the possibly erroneous first
view. This presumption of objectivity when acting in role can be defeated in
particular cases by demonstrating actual irrationality in behavior. But the line
between what is learned in role and what is learned outside of role is nonetheless
a major reference point.
Like many hypotheses about the rich complexities of human behavior this
one is more the product of practical necessity and historical acceptance than
rigorous scientific demonstration. Doubtless a criminal defendant ordered to trial
again before the judge whose verdict he has just had reversed on appeal worries
that his burden may be greater now than it previously was, and so it may be.
But the community's resources are limited; for centuries judges have been retry-
ing cases, and passing on the presence of both prima facie showings and proof
of guilt, without notable outcry or demonstration of unfairness; to eliminate these
practices would make public administration more costly and cumbersome.
Moreover, the judges who have to decide these issues perceive in themselves and
in centuries of professional tradition a capacity in fact to learn from and sur-
mount demonstrations of past error, and to maintain a "professional" attitude
toward matters put before them. These perceptions could be challenged, but they
persist and are supported by history and widespread judicial confidence. They
are also readily ascribed to administrators performing similar functions.
Moreover, in both contexts, the practical advantages of belief in them are sub-
stantial.
For administrators, roles are far less confined than they are for judges, and
so the sweep of what may be learned and the possible opportunities for a pre-
judgment may seem greater, even when the administrator acts entirely within
role. Yet the Supreme Court does not appear to have concluded that only those
official functions that would also be performed by a judge consistent with judi-
108. The Court remarked, in distinguishing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), that it was
of course possible that unacceptable risks of bias might "lurk in the way particular procedures actu-
ally work in practice." The issue of concern on that analysis, however, would be the same as that
identified in the text-whether the circumstances shown were so likely to produce a personal
psychological attachment to a particular outcome as to defeat the assumption that the officers are
"'men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on
the basis of its own circumstances.' " 421 U.S. at 55, quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409, 421 (1941).
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cial duty are consistent with fairness in adjudicative activities. Judges do not
make ex parte investigations and report to Congress, as did the Commissioners
in Cement Institute; nor do they initiate the filing of charges, as did the Board in
Withrow. Indeed, the Court in Withrow indicated its approval of Pangburn v.
CAB, a First Circuit decision finding no constitutional unfairness in the CAB's
both performing a "Congressional mandate to investigate and report the probable
cause of all civil air accidents" for a recent accident and subsequently hearing a
disciplinary proceeding against a pilot involved in that accident, whose conduct
the report had criticized.10 9 The Court simultaneously withheld its approval of
some lower court holdings that had found due process violations, apparently in
reliance on the judicial analogy. 110
3. The Court of Appeals Cases. The court of appeals opinions on agency
disqualification in on-the-record adjudications have been generally consistent in
result if not always in expression, with the distinction between "personal
psychological" influences and judgments reached or expressed in the course of
official business.1"1 Quite naturally, however, the courts of appeals have often
been more deeply involved in the particular facts of the cases before them, Three
cases in particular, all influential, convey a tone very different from the Supreme
Court cases.
Two of the cases, Texaco, Inc. v. FTC 12 and Cinderella Career & Finish-
ing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 1 13 arose out of speeches made by FTC Chairman Paul
Rand Dixon during the pendency of adjudication. In each case, the speech was
interpreted by a party and the courts as indicating that the Chairman had made
up his mind in advance of decision, and therefore must be disqualified. No prior
unofficial connection with the cases, interest, animus, or other "personal
psychological" commitment appears to have been shown. So far as appears, it is
merely that while the cases were pending on the docket and not decided, Chair-
man Dixon spoke about them in a way that conveyed the impression that he had
made up his mind. The court in both cases expressed as the test for disqualifica-
tion whether " 'a disinterested observer may conclude that [the Commissioner]
has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in
advance of hearing it.' "114
109. 421 U.S. at 50-51 n.16, quoting Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 1962).
110. 421 U.S. at 50-51 n.16.
S111. Thus, Chairman Dixon of the FTC was disqualified in American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363
F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), on account of his prior active service as counsel to an aggressive Senate
subcommittee concerned with the same facts and issues. But compare Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC,
366 F.2d 795, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1966). Commissioners of the SEC and the CAB were disqualified on
the basis of their advocacy roles prior to becoming commissioners in Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306
F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962), and Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
respectively. But FfC and CAB commissioners who as commissioners pursued investigations to
develop, and reached conclusions about, facts later put at issue in sanction-seeking adjudication were
not disqualified. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 358
(lst Cir. 1962). Compare the discussion of "structural" as opposed to "individual" prejudgment in
Porter County Chapter v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1370-72 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
112. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
113. 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114. 336 F.2d at 760; 425 F.2d at 591. Both courts cited for this formulation Gilligan, Will &
Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). But in that case
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A striking characteristic of both opinions is that the conclusion drawn by the
court-that Chairman Dixon was addressing the merits of particular cases in his
speeches-is not an obvious one. Cinderella, for example, concerned an FTC
fraud action against a vocational school alleged to have falsely promised training
that would lead to jobs as airline hostesses. The school's complaint arose from
Chairman Dixon's address to a convention of newspaper publishers, seeking to
build understanding and support for Commission policy-a responsibility com-
mon to commissioners but foreign to judges. As one familiar with wide varieties
of consumer fraud, he called on the publishers to exercise some vigor in screen-
ing advertisements for possible fraud and gave a series of examples of what he
had in mind-a merchant's periodic "going out of business" sale, offering col-
lege educations in five weeks or fortunes from raising mushrooms in the base-
ment, eliminating pimples with a magic lotion, becoming a stewardess by attend-
ing charm school. 1 15 Dixon did not mention the Cinderella Career and
Finishing School or any particular facts of their case that might have shown
whether it did or did not make fraudulent claims. To this writer it is not surpris-
ing that after a few years on the job, an FTC commissioner could regard any of
the stated claims as prima facie evidence of consumer fraud, an attitude that
would not be disqualifying so long as the commissioner remained able to decide
whether a particular defendant had in fact made such claims. But to the court,
this speech marked Dixon as "insensitive," a man of "questionable discretion
and very poor judgment," and led it to disqualify him." 6  In the Texaco case,
too, Chairman Dixon's words were less conclusive of factual prejudgment than is
often assumed. 1 1 7
disqualification was refused; the language appears there merely as part of precatory advice to the
Commission that to preserve its "reputation for objectivity and impartiality" it should write press
releases about pending cases in a restrained manner.
115. 425 F.2d at 589-590. The court regarded the college and charm school claims as refer-
ences to Cinderella.
116.
It is appalling to witness such insensitivity to the requirements of due process; it is
even more remarkable to find ourselves once again confronted with a situation in which
Mr. Dixon, pouncing on the most convenient victim, has determined either to distort the
holdings in the cited cases beyond all reasonable interpretation or to ignore them al-
together. We are constrained to this harshness of language because of Mr. Dixon's
flagrant disregard of prior decisions.
425 F.2d at 590-91.
117. In Texaco, Chairman Dixon spoke to the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers after
the Commission had finally decided charges of price fixing, price discrimination, and overriding
commissions brought against a number of firms supplying gasoline and accessory parts to the dealers;
a case against Texaco and Goodrich remained pending, however, in light of an earlier remand.
Chairman Dixon said:
We at the Commission are well aware of the practices which plague you and we
have challenged their legality in many important cases.
You know the practices-price fixing, price discrimination, and overriding com-
missions on TBA.
You know the companies-Atlantic, Texas, Pure, Shell, Sun, Standard of Indiana,
American, Goodyear, Goodrich, and Firestone.
Some of these cases are still pending before the Commission; some have been
decided by the Commission and are in the courts on appeal. You may be sure that the
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One might explain these results as the product of Dixon's strong personal-
ity,118 or perceptions by the court that he had been unresponsive to its con-
cems. 119  More broadly, it could be suggested that much of the law of bias and
disqualification involves the enforcement of rules of decorum, the disciplining of
verbal ruffians more than the attainment of actual objectivity in factfinders. Of
course judges know that an administrator's repeated exposure to challenged
commercial conduct will give him strong ideas about what types are
fraudulent-often well in advance of decision in a particular case. 120  They
know, too, that the official functions of administrators, unlike judges, include
keeping the public and the legislature informed of what they are doing and the
policies they are enforcing. In the context of administrative sanctioning, how-
ever, vigorous public statement of these ideas or pursuit of these functions
threatens common understandings of fairness. Judges do not decide to bring
prosecutions, give luncheon speeches, testify to Congress, or issue press re-
leases. The judicial nerve may be set on a hair-trigger by the fact that adminis-
Commission will continue and, to the extent that increased funds and efficiency permit,
will increase its efforts to promote fair competition in your industry.
336 F.2d at 759. The Commission had already settled the policy issues, and had already determined
what the practites of some of the companies named were and that those practices were in violation of
the law. One need not read this statement to say more than that the Commission has found certain
practices to be illegal in a series of cases; some cases, however, remain to be decided. The court
found in it a promise to convict Texaco-not only if its practices proved to be the same (which
could hardly have been objectionable), but in any event.
Judge Washington, concurring, recognized this problem, but believed the mention of Texaco by
name (an element missing irk Cinderella) would make it appear to a disinterested observer that
Chairman Dixon had in fact prejudged its particular guilt. Once having publicly made a statement
"'apparently inconsistent with an ability to judge the facts fairly," 336 F.2d at 764 (emphasis added),
the Commissioner could not restore his capacity to sit by protesting his openmindedness. The ques-
tion is one of appearances, not actualities; and in Judge Washington's eyes, at least, that appearance
arose from Chairman Dixon's choice of forum as much as his words. See Note, Administrative Law,
Restraint of Trade, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 658 (1965).
118. One impartial observer, noting the repeated appearance of Chairman Dixon in these cases,
explains them as the product of an unjustified "degree of personal involvement manifested by Dixon.
That the result in these two cases depended so much on [his] personality . . . can be seen from other
cases in which a reviewing court was not prepared to assume that prior public statements of an
official would preclude him from carrying out his public duty." G. Flick, Natural Justice 128, 129 &
n.68 (1979), citing Cement Institute; National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1955); and Skelly Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), modified on
other grounds sub nom. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). Kennecott Copper
Co. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), might also have been cited.
119. The Cinderella opinion marked the second effort by the defendant in the Commission
action to raise prejudgment issues. The first had been brought on account of a Commission press
release alerting the public to Cinderella's "suspected violations" of the FTC Act; on March 12,
1968, the court of appeals upheld the Commission, specifically remarking on the factual (not in-
flammatory) character of the press release and its recognition that guilt had not yet been established.
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Chairman
Dixon's speech, the Cinderella II court rather pointedly notes, was made just three days later. It must
have seemed to the court as if he were deliberately flouting the balance it had sought to achieve
between the administrative practice (unusual to a judge) and the demands of fairness.
120. When judges have disqualified other judges for excessive commitment, it has often been in
such terms as "A judge best serves the administration of justice by remaining detached from the
conflict between the parties." Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1976). One
cannot easily substitute "administrator" for "judge" in that sentence, especially regarding policies or
disputes that must be managed over time.
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trators combine these functions; the perceived potential for abuse and onesided-
ness may dispose some judges to find factual, personal incapacity to adjudicate
in blunt talk alone, wholly in the absence of outside, unofficial, or irrational
influence.
However one may react to these speculations, it is apparent that the
Texaco-Cinderella formulation does not fairly capture the ruling cases. 1 2 1 It is
far too broad. In Cement Institute, in Pangburn, and in Withrow, the agency had
"in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law." Perhaps one could
argue that in Cement Institute the facts adjudged were legislative rather than
adjudicative in character-that no particular judgment about the behavior of any
specific party was made; 122 but the prejudged facts of Pangburn and Withrow
plainly were case- and party-unique. What was missing from those cases but
present in Chairman Dixon's speeches (at least in the eyes of the reviewing
courts), was the irrational aggressiveness of personal commitment, a commitment
making level-headed second thoughts appeartoo remote a possibility for fairness.
Commitment, rather than exposure to facts or the exercise of judgment respect-
ing them, appears in fact to have been the key.
The third of the influential court of appeals cases, Pillsbury v. FTC, 123 also
involved an FTC chairman-in this instance Chairman Howrey-and the spectre
of personal commitment. Chairman Howrey had been called before a Senate
committee to answer questions about FTC policy in interpreting section 7 of the
Clayton Act 12 4 -a common enough occurrence, and clearly part of his official
function. The Senators' questioning forcefully and repeatedly criticized an inter-
locutory legal conclusion the Commission had earlier reached in an adjudication
involving Pillsbury pending before an FTC hearing examiner at the time of the
Senate hearings. The Senators favored an approach more adverse to Pillsbury's
interests. Chairman Howrey defended the Commission's legal conclusions
gamely for a while. Then, after he had been accused by a Senator of having
"done some damage to [his] judicial position" by joining in an Attorney Gener-
al's committee's report on some of these questions, Chairman Howrey abruptly
announced his withdrawal from the Pillsbury case, because "the question you
are asking . . . is a much greater challenge to judicial processes, because I am
sitting as a quasi-judicial officer in that case." 125 Chairman Howrey was soon
off the Commission, but several others who had been in the Senate hearing room
121. Judge Tamm is at pains in his opinion for the majority in ANA, not once but twice, to
explain Cinderella-a case in which "a person faceedl administrative prosecution for past
behavior"-as involving "specific" reference to the adjudication pending and prejudgment of "pre-
cise factual issues." Slip op. at 19. Whether or not this accurately describes the case as it was, the
characterization suggests a limited future for the formula even for adjudicatory disqualification.
122. This distinction is made by the majority opinions in ANA, slip op. at 38 (Tamm, J.) and 5
(Leventhal, J., concurring), and by Judge Washington in his Texaco concurrence, 336 F.2d at 764
n.6.
123. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
125. 354 F.2d at 961. At the time of this inquest, Chairman Howrey is said already to have
informed the White House of his intention to resign; in this context, his "withdrawal" from the case
may have the guise of tactics more than injured judicial mien.
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with him were commissioners five years later when the Commission decided
against Pillsbury, maintaining again the legal theory the Senators had so vigor-
ously challenged. Having been exposed to that pressure, the Fifth Circuit ruled,
these commissioners should have disqualified themselves:
To subject an administrator to a searching examination as to how
and why he reached his decision in a case still pending before him,
and to criticize him for reaching the "wrong" decision, as the Senate
subcommittee did in this case, sacrifices the appearance of
impartiality-the sine qua non of American judicial justice-in favor
of some short-run notions regarding the Congressional intent underly-
ing an amendment to a statute, unfettered administration of which was
committed by Congress to the Federal Trade Commission (See 15
U.S.C.A. § 21).126
Here again, one senses that the court may have overreacted. Had the
Pillsbury Corporation not been named, the committee would surely have been
permitted to inquire into the important legal interpretation at issue. Like Chair-
man Dixon's speeches, Chairman Howrey's appearance was a necessary and
legitimate official function, but one not shared by judges. In refusing to recog-
nize these functions, or in imposing strict standards of decorum, the appeals
courts were to some degree denying validity to the presumption repeatedly relied
upon by the Supreme Court, that public officers will be able to carry out all their
official functions in a manner consistent with fairness. It is at least doubtful
whether the Supreme Court could make the judgment "that, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," combining ad-
judicative with public or congressional discussions of agency business "poses
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if
the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented." 127 The courts
of appeals, closer to the agencies and (perhaps for that reason) more skeptical of
their performance, seem quicker to conclude that a decisionmaker has com-
promised his integrity.
Each of the cases discussed arose in a strictly accusatory context, the setting
in which concern for fairness, and adjudicatory objectivity as an element of fair-
ness, has always been strongest. Given that context and appropriate sensitivity to
the distinction between individual circumstances and general policy, between
what Cinderella in particular may have done and career school practices gener-
ally, the rules fashioned by the courts of appeals match general expectations
about the demands of justice and cause no substantial inconvenience to agency
functioning. It is significant that the results of these cases appear not to be
significantly galling to-and, indeed, are in some respects welcomed by-the
agencies whose behavior they control. Agencies are concerned with public per-
ceptions of their credibility and fairness, and commissioners can find ways of
talking about policy to the public or Congress without having to discuss the
126. Id. at 964 (footnote omitted).
127. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), citing Cement Institute.
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details of pending cases. The occasional "allegedly" or "our staff has asserted
that" does not significantly interfere with any discussion a commissioner might
wish to have, and contributes to the public's sense of his judiciousness. 128 The
ability to warn Senator Smith's staff before a hearing to stay away from cases X
or Y, now pending in litigation, offers, from the agency's view, welcome protec-
tion. No central function is threatened, and in the context of adjudication in
on-the-record accusatory cases, the core values of impartiality are at stake. If the
courts of appeals have been inattentive to differences between administrative and
judicial functions in this context, the negative impacts of the resulting "judiciali-
zation" are slight, and the gains in apparent fairness to a public used to the
judicial model may be substantial. In the setting in which, under the Constitution
and the APA, administrative and judicial functions most closely merge, a hair-
trigger response to apparent impropriety is acceptable.
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON POLICYMAKERS: DISQUALIFICATION
FOR "BIAS" OR "ANIMUS" IN RULEMAKING
The introduction to this Article suggested some of the special characteristics
of agency rulemaking (or, more broadly, policymaking) complicating any inquiry
into the question which individuals should not be permitted to participate in
rulemaking. The intervening pages have sketched the two obvious models from
which reasoning might be essayed, and the possible lines of extension of one,
conflict of interest regulation, to rulemaking. What follows examines the possi-
ble application in the rulemaking context of prejudgment standards, and the
somewhat distinct issue of "animus."
As already remarked, no agency currently provides in its regulations for
disqualification in rulemaking for other than conflicts of interest. An explanation
is provided by the reasons for limiting even conflict of interest analysis, and
pointedly expressed in the agency responses to the ACUS survey. While private
claims to "impartiality" are not thought to be as large in rulemaking as in
adjudication-particular factfinding is not often involved, the stakes for particu-
lar individuals may often be less, and in any event the stakes are multi-
dimensional-the chief reasons stated have to do with institutional functioning:
"In policy-making or informal rulemaking ... .adoption of dis-
qualification rules ...could inhibit the appointment and functioning
of extremely qualified individuals whose very views were significant in
their consideration for appointments . 1.2. 91
Disqualification "would be contrary to one of the main reasons
for having agencies in the first place-namely, to create a storehouse
of information that can be brought to bear on regulatory decisions in a
flexible manner." 130
128. See Kennecot Copper Co. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
129. Letter of Dep't of Agriculture to Richard K. Berg, Executive Sec'y, ACUS, dated Aug. 7,
1979, at 2.
130. Letter of Environmental Protection Agency, dated June 25, 1979, at 1.
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Other "procedural mechanisms ... promote intellectual honesty
and the appearance of fairness"-full notice, detailed explanation, re-
cording of outside contacts, full internal consultations among numerous
employees, etc. "A rule requiring disqualification . . . might force the
agency to exclude its senior officials from the earliest periods of the
decisionmaking process," yet such officials naturally must respond to
newly discovered concerns, to the public and to Congress, and that
response requires "detailed knowledge" and "candid discussion." ,
"[A]gency decision-makers should be encouraged to discuss the
policy issues before their agency with the public and to give their
views on those issues." The possibility of disqualification "will dis-
courage [such discussions] and thus injure the public's ability to under-
stand (and influence) agency policy-making decisions.
"Finally, the President . . . [a]s the nation's highest elected offi-
cial . . . may properly . . . select nominees who are predisposed to
carry out the policies of his administration . . . . To bar Members
from participating . . . because of their policy preferences would frus-
trate the President's authority .... , 132
Some scope for disqualification nonetheless appears to be recognized, even
though not formally provided for. For example, many agencies stated that a
decisionmaker personally unable to accept and respond to public input during the
public processes of rulemaking would appropriately be subject to disqualifica-
tion. Seven independent agencies submitted an amicus curiae brief at the court of
appeals level in the ANA litigation, in which they put forward the proposition,
adopted in haec verba by the court, that disqualification should occur "when
there has been a clear and convincing showing that the agency member has an
unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceed-
ing." 133 Responses to the ACUS survey suggested a widespread disposition to
apply a similar standard-excluding the closed-minded, but with care not to
discourage the public expression, even strongly, of "preliminary views." 134
Chilling of that dialogue was frequently identified as a major negative conse-
quence of a disqualification standard, and one therefore to be guarded against in
its formulation.
131. Letter of the Food & Drug Division, Office of General Counsel of Dep't of HEW, dated
July 24, 1979, at 3-4.
132. Letter from Philip 1. Bakes, Jr., General Counsel, CAB, dated Aug. 16, 1979, at 2.
133. Brief for Independent Regulatory Agencies as Amici Curiae at 14-15.
134. "[l]ntemperate public statements," indicating that one is "not prepared to approach reg-
ulatory decisions with a mind open to persuasion," arguably disqualify-but on account of "per-
sonal attitudes of the decisionmaker in question, not . . . what he was exposed to by way of informa-
tion." Letter of EPA, supra note 130.
The Department of Transportation referred to "personal hostility" or unalterable predisposition,
as distinct from knowledgeability. "The question should be whether the degree of disposition pre-
cludes the decisionmakers from being objective." Individual responses from the agencies signatory to
the amicus brief reflected a similar view.
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The response of the Consumer Product Safety Commission suggested a re-
lated proposition, analogous to the rule that a judge should not participate in
appellate review of his own trial decision. An administrator, the response
suggests, is more capable of reevaluating a judgment he has previously made but
identified as tentative-a proposed rule, a determination of probable cause, or
the like-than a judgment taken with an expectation of finality, and for this
reason should avoid external activities in which "final" judgment on matters of
interest to the Commission may be called for.1 35  This consideration appears to
be reflected in the Conference's recent recommendations on Federal Agency In-
teraction with Private Standard-Setting Organizations in Health and Safety Regu-
lation. 13 6  Standard-setting organizations produce rule-like definitions of health
and safety standards which may also be the subject of federal rulemaking; the
Conference believed that agency participation in standard setting was desirable,
but that this participation had to be shielded from the fact or appearance of
agency commitment to the standards set. Thus, it reasoned, agency representa-
tives should have no authority to vote in the standard-setting organization or bind
the agency to its conclusions; within the agency itself the representatives should
exercise no decisional authority (as distinct from providing information and ad-
vice) save in cases of necessity. The CPSC has adopted more far-reaching regu-
lations insulating participants in standard-setting from decisional responsibility in
rulemaking. 137
The Conference recommendation and CPSC rules are, in effect, limited dis-
qualification standards. Certain agency officials responsible for rulemaking are
instructed not to engage in other, parallel behavior thought to compromise either
the fact or the appearance of their objectivity. Conference consideration of this
aspect of the recommendation was apparently controversial, some believing that
at least unconscious cooption or commitment would result if the rulemaker were
permitted to take part in the intense consideration preceding adoption of a volun-
tary standard; others, that any disqualification regime would intrude on institu-
tional decision processes, rendering them less expert by depriving the agency of
135. A similar distinction appears to have been drawn by the Supreme Court in Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 n.25 (1975). It may rest more on a right to have review be independent if
review is provided than on general propositions about the psychological readiness of the decision-
maker to reconsider. When a judge is instructed by an appellate tribunal to retry a case, or decides
himself to do so on the basis of post-verdict motions, we do not regard his objectivity in the second
trial as having been compromised by his participation in the first-even though he regarded his first
decision when reached as "final" in the usual sense.
136. ACUS Recommendation 78-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-4 (1980). The supporting study, Hamil-
ton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards
Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1329 (1978), discusses government employee participa-
tion at 1466-73.
137. 16 C.F.R. Part 1031 (1980). The stated concern of the regulations is with avoiding the risk
of "losing . . . independence or impartiality." They preclude a designated group of high level offi-
cials who "make the final decision [within CPSC] or . . . advise those who make [it]" from any
participation in nongovernmental standard-setting agencies; permit another designated group whose
members "develop the final recommendation" to participate only with case-by-case clearance; and
allow other employees to participate only on stated conditions-that they not lead, that their partici-
pation not be approved in advance and reported upon afterwards, that meetings be public, and so
forth. Other agency practices, as of 1977, are described in Hamilton, supra note 136, at 1467-69.
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its best-informed personnel and disturbing the informal flow of ideas. Similar
lines of controversy can be expected as a result of the study from which this
Article is derived.
1 3s
The resolution reached suggests two judgments restricting disqualification,
from which some instruction may possibly be taken. The first is that disqualifica-
tion need not occur if "the agency has no other personnel with the requisite
knowledge and expertise"; the second, that it extends only to decision making
and not to "providing information and advice."
The first of these judgments is far more forgiving than the "doctrine of
necessity" sometimes applicable in the adjudicatory context. In adjudication, that
there is no equally qualified substitute decider is not enough to invoke necessity;
a substitute must be wholly unavailable. In the consultant's report leading to the
Conference recommendation, the view had been strongly expressed that
representatives to standard-setting organizations be drawn from no higher than
middle level employees, "tlo preserve the appearance of agency independence
and objectivity." 139 This limitation was not expressed in the Conference
recommendation, apparently on the understanding that high level participation
would sometimes be desirable. Thus, while the recommendation implies that
high level participation should ordinarily be avoided, its disqualification standard
is a weak one, rather easily overcome by the agency's needs.
The second judgment, that the agency representative to the standard setter
may continue to provide information and advice within the agency, is also more
permissive than adjudicatory disqualification.1 40  As separation of functions and
ex parte contact rules vividly show, restrictions on informing and advising by
"biased" participants are regarded as central to the assurance of objectivity in
adjudication. The recommended measure here serves more to create a buffer than
to exclude the decisionmakers from the processes, influences, and results of the
138. The dispute is itself unlikely to prove objectively resolvable; our knowledge of human
psychology does not extend to quantifying the degrees of commitment or cooption that result from
deciding that an issue is important enough to be studied, from participating in the formulation of
proposal drafts on the basis of initial information and views, or from taking part as an agency
representative in the compromise process of an external group facing similar issues. However, no
agency and no court currently regards the first two activities as disqualifying; they are a regular part
of the activity of agency rulemakers. The third activity is, of course, the subject of the conference
recommendation.
139. Hamilton, supra note 136, at 1472.
140. A similar accommodation appears in the recent Conference recommendation on reim-
bursement of participants' expenses by the FTC, ACUS Recommendation 79-5, 45 Fed. Reg. 2307
(1980) (to be codified at I C.F.R. § 305.79-5). The staff engaged in developing proposed rules, the
Conference's consultant concluded, often acquired "strong feelings about the need for regulation and
the shape that rule provisions ought to take." B. Boyer, Expense-Reimbursing Public Participants in
Administrative Rulemaking: The Federal Trade Commission Experience 79-80 (Draft 1979). The
resulting "color" on the staffs funding recommendations strongly supports the FTC's judgment,
approved by the Conference, to have others make the funding decision. At the same time, their
advice is essential for efficient assessment of the applicant's potential contribution to a complex
record; and public disclosure of that advice (with possible ensuing controversies) presents costs
which, it seems to have been agreed, outweigh any benefits of publicity. Thus, the Conference has
recommended that rulemaking staff be permitted to advise but not decide about reimbursement issues;
"wherever feasible," those who do decide should also be given access to experts outside the offices
directly responsible for the rulemaking.
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voluntary standard-setting process. The buffer is useful in preserving apparent
freedom of action and apparent objectivity; but the judgment creating it (like the
judgments confining the reach of separation of functions and ex parte contact
constraints) is a limited one, sensitive to the needs of an institutional decisional
process.
A. Bias or Prejudgment- Association of National Advertisers v. FTC
The procedural context of the ANA case,"' described briefly in the intro-
duction, made it a relatively strong case for considering rulemaking disqualifica-
tion. Although no statutory or regulatory provision explicitly requires imoartial-
ity, Congress has provided in the Magnuson-Moss Act a statutory regime with
many of the trappings of trial procedure. For Judge Gesell in the district court
the syllogism was simple. On-the-record proceedings involving adversary, oral
procedures ordinarily require impartiality in the decisionmaker. Magnuson-Moss
Act procedures envision adversary, on-the-record proceedings as to certain facts.
Therefore, participants in Magnuson-Moss Act rulemakings are entitled to a de-
cisionmaker impartial as to those facts. 142 Whether or not one agrees that the
issue here is as simple as Judge Gesell found it, the relative strength of the case
for a disqualification regime should be apparent.
This line of argument depends for its strength on the presence of a require-
ment for on-the-record adversariness, procedures that make objectivity important.
As has already been remarked, 14 3 nothing in section 553 of the APA or general
agency practice under that provision suggests a basis for such an argument re-
specting rulemaking generally. And the majority in the court of appeals on re-
view of ANA found that, even in the special statutory circumstances of
Magnuson-Moss, the characteristics of rulemaking required disqualification re-
gimes to be significantly more limited than those applying in adjudication. It
agreed that an impartial decisionmaker was required. But the differing nature of
factual issues in rulemaking and adjudications, the impossibility of separating
fact from policy in the former setting, and the administrator's corresponding
imperative to form and express his views at an early stage, led it to eschew
"formulation of a disqualification standard that impinges on the political proc-
ess." 144 Judge Tamm wrote for himself and Judge Leventhal that an agency
member may be disqualified (in rulemaking) "only when there has been a clear
and convincing showing that [he] has an unalterably closed mind on matters
critical to the disposition of the proceeding." 141 On the facts, he found, that
test was not met. Judge MacKinnon, in dissent, found this test too strong a
formulation-a fence "horse high, pig tight and bull strong." 146 Drawing
what he found to be appropriate inferences from the FTC's special rulemaking
141. No. 79-1117 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (1980).
142. 460 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1978).
143. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
144. ANA, slip op. at 48.
145. Id. at 38.
146. Id. at 15 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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procedures, he concluded that partiality could be established by a preponderant
showing of substantial prejudgment on any critical fact; that showing, he argued
at length, had been made.
I. A Constitutional Requirement of Openmindedness in Rulemaking? Rec-
ognizing that statutes like those involved in ANA might present the strongest case
for disqualification regimes, one may nonetheless start with the issue whether
due process requires impartiality as to fact (as distinct from freedom from dis-
abling conflicts of interests) in all informal rulemaking. A more general premise
than Judge Gesell employed in his reasoning, one suggesting extension of dis-
qualification standards to less formal rulemakings, would be that constitutional
due process requires impartiality (however defined) in the decisionmaker in any
rulemaking likely to have significant adverse impacts on an individual. Under
this premise, the ANA dispute would not turn only on the meaning of the
Magnuson-Moss Act, and disqualification might be an appropriate issue in any
significant APA rulemaking.
A due process argument for disqualification in rulemaking must begin with
recognition of the very limited scope the Supreme Court has given "prejudg-
ment" as a due process issue in cases of adjudication, suggesting as a test even
in that context whether the decisionmaker's mind was "irrevocably closed" or
subject to a "personal" (as distinct from official) psychological commit-
ment. 147 Beyond that, the Court has given little indication that it regards due
process as a significant issue for any purpose in the rulemaking context. While
legislative procedure, as distinct from legislative result, might seem fairly within
the reach of due process concerns, 148 the Supreme Court appears committed to
Justice Holmes's classic proposition that in policy formation, citizen interests are
protected "in the only way they can be in a complex society, by [the individu-
al's] power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." 149 Any
exceptions, it has supposed, would be "extremely rare," 150 as where the deter-
minations are essentially individual in character, affecting particular persons in
an exceptional way; 151 they would not occur in the context of general rulemak-
ing. 152
In his thoughtful analysis of the "due process of lawmaking," 153 Professor
(now Justice) Hans Linde drew a distinction between legislation and rulemaking
147. See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
148. The Supreme Court's analyses of the circumstances in which process is constitutionally
due have stressed the need to show a deprivation of "life, liberty or property," see, e.g., Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). It is regarded as generally inappropriate to examine a statute
for that effect; such an analysis evokes the dubious realm of substantive due process. Rules would
appear to present a like situation.
149. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (emphasis
added). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978).
150. 435 U.S. at 524.
151. Id. at 542. See also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
152. 435 U.S. at 542 n.16.
153. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976).
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which could further the "fairness" claim, and thus diminish the force of
Holmes's aphorism. "[Plolicy-makers . . . limited to prescribed aims," as
agency rulemakers are, may be distinguished theoretically from legislators "free
to pursue any aim of their own choice." 154 The former, he asserted, have a
constitutional obligation of explanation or justification not shared by general pur-
pose legislative bodies-a "duty to defend the rationality of a decision," to use
"the methods of rational policy analysis" to relate the action taken to "a goal
within the scope of [their] assignment." 155 Acceptance of this distinction, not
yet to be found in Supreme Court opinions, would give constitutional dimensions
to whatever procedures may be inherently required for "rational policy
analysis." 156
The judges of the court of appeals seem to have assumed that "due proc-
ess" was implicated in their judgment, but without explaining how they reached
this result. 1 5  Although the majority and minority opinions do not rely on Pro-
fessor Linde's analysis, one aspect of their disagreement suggests parallels to his
distinction between general-purpose and special-purpose rulemakers. The major-
ity draws heavily on an analogy to legislative action in reaching its conclusion
that "due process" requires little independent of what Congress may have cho-
sen to require; 158 elsewhere the majority stresses the necessarily political charac-
ter of general rulemaking and the need to avoid legal rules that would inhibit its
operation. 1 59 For Judge MacKinnon, on the other hand, the analogy to a legis-
lature is inapt: legislative bodies are controlled by the diversity of their member-
ship and direct electoral responsibilities; agencies may have some political as-
pects, but judicial enforcement of principles of rational decisionmaking (which in
154. Id. at 229.
155. Id. at 225-30.
156. The argument for the Linde approach might seem particularly strong where the rulemaking
will resolve technological or other issues of a specific and factual, more than judgmental,
character-especially if those issues would otherwise be subject to resolution in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. The question then would be whether the presence of prejudgment, as distinct from financial
self-interest, is inconsistent with those procedures.
Professor Linde's analysis and some existing case law suggest that serving financial self-interest
may be constitutionally disqualifying in this setting. Id. at 249-50, citing McNamara v. Borough of
Saddle River, 60 N.J. Super. 367, 158 A.2d 722 (1960); see also State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v.
Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 436, 440-46, 254 P.2d 29, 31-34 (1953). The Supreme
Court's decision in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 (1979), on the other hand, unanimously
denied the existence of any "constitutional right to be regulated by a Board that is sympathetic to
[that is, not structured to be financially biased against] the commercial practice of optometry," and
limited the due process claim for disqualification for financial interest specially to the setting of a
"disciplinary proceeding." No basis for claiming disqualification for factual prejudgment, a weaker
claim than financial self-interest, appears.
157. ANA, slip op. at 47 (Tamm, J.), 3 (Leventhal, J., concurring). The references to "funda-
mental notions of fairness" in other D.C. Circuit rulemaking review opinions are equally without
precedential support, and tend to involve determinations of limited and exceptional impact. E.g.,
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
Compare Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
158. ANA, slip op. at 27-28. "No court to our knowledge has imposed procedural requirements
on a legislature before it may act. Indeed, any suggestion that congressmen may not prejudge factual
and policy issues is fanciful." Id. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937). Compare
Hennessy v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
159. ANA, slip op. at 34-35, 48.
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this instance include protections against prejudgment) is also fully appro-
priate. 16 0  Whether on his analysis these principles emerge from the Constitution
independent of statute is unclear, but perhaps not important to resolve.
This is, of course, hardly the first instance when confusion or controversy
has clouded judicial determinations of what "fairness" requires. The vigorous
and sometimes bitter debates within the Vinson and Warren Courts regarding
"incorporation" of Bill of Rights liberties into the fourteenth amendment by
interpretation of the due process clause pitted proponents of informed judicial
intuition, on the one hand, against those who insisted that responsible judicial
action could be based only on concrete, external sources. 16 1  If explicit stan-
dards are to be the guide, none exist in the Constitution, in the regular practice
of legislatures or the case law respecting it, or indeed in the prior case law of
administrative procedure. The ANA majority explicitly notes this absence of ex-
ternal standards, even as it proceeds to "determin[e] the due process standards
applicable." 162 If, on the other hand, judges are to rely on informed judicial
intuition-and in the administrative law context there may be no realistic
alternative 163 -the risks of that approach have led judges using it to seek "to
eliminate the purely personal preference," by "respectful deference" to the
views of other tribunals or the legislature and by deriving conclusions from
judgments already made by others rather than by "making new moral
choices." 164 As has been seen, external judgments about the requirements of
fairness in rulemaking are few, and those that exist are extremely permis-
sive. 165  Should a statute be enacted explicitly denying any opportunity to claim
disqualification for prejudgment by a rulemaker, it would surely withstand con-
stitutional attack.166 Despite the trappings of constitutional language and evi-
160. Id. at 26-29.
161. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). To my colleague Benno Schmidt, Jr., I owe the
observation that this dispute should not be understood merely as one over judicial function in the
determination of procedural issues; it occurred in the wake of the substantive due process excesses of
the 1920's and 1930's, and each side might have believed its approach better constituted to avoiding
a renewal of judicial aggrandizement. See generally Linde, supra note 153.
162. ANA, slip op. at 27-28.
163. That understanding appears to be reflected in the Court's often quoted observation, in
Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), that "[tihe very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion."
164. G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 523 (9th ed. 1975), quoting Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J., 319 (1957). Certainly
in the incorporation debate those who pursued the more subjective, "civilized standards of decency"
approach demonstrated by the results they reached substantial deference to the procedural assessments
of others; procedural activism is associated with the pro-incorporation side of the debate. The Court
has often stressed deference to congressional judgment about administrative procedure, using those
judgments as a model for its own determinations as well as generally refusing to disturb them under
challenge. Compare Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950),
with Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
165. See note 156 supra.
166. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), discussed in note 156 supra.
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dent concern of the judges for "fairness," the decision in ANA is best under-
stood as a statutory holding only.
2. Inferring Prejudgment Standards from Procedural Choices. Although it
was influenced by intuitive notions of fairness, the court of appeals debate
chiefly concerned how Congress's procedural choices in the Magnuson-Moss Act
bore on the disqualification issue. Several propositions appear to have been
agreed upon by all judges: first, that the disqualification question had not been
explicitly faced in Congress, for any specific congressional resolution would
have been controlling; second, that some standard of disqualification should be
inferred from the Magnuson-Moss Act procedures; third, that this standard had
particular importance for those factual issues that were to be referred for decision
on the record, following trial-type procedure; and finally, that the Cinderella test
for adjudication, whether "a disinterested observer may conclude that [he] has in
some measure adjudged the facts . . . in advance of hearing," was inapplicable.
Even the dissent would have required "the moving party [to] show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the decisionmaker could not participate fairly in the
formulation of the rule because of substantial bias or prejudgment on any critical
fact that must be resolved in such formulation." 167 The stressed words indicate
the areas of disagreement with the majority,' 1 68 to which we shortly return; for
the moment we focus on the areas of agreement.
a. Matters Not in Dispute-A Limited Standard for Special Circumstances.
Majority and dissent agreed on the proposition, which also characterizes current
congressional efforts at general administrative reform, that prejudgment is an
appropriate inquiry for-but only for-issues requiring the procedures of trial
for resolution. Any general consideration of extending the use of "modified,"
"general," or "hybrid" procedures will inevitably involve consideration of the
extent to which the objectivity of the decisionmaker must be assured. To gauge
by currently pending reform proposals, moreover, any congressional action will
impose a measure of disqualification in proceedings conducted in some measure
on the record through trial-type procedures.1 69 In contrast with the APA separa-
tion of functions provisions discussed above,17 0 all the pending proposals assume
that some internal separation of functions should be enforced, that to that extent
the influence of prejudgment or bias is to be avoided.'17  Such protections read-
167. ANA, slip op. at 37 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
168. See text accompanying note 188 infra.
169. Debate over the extent to which objectivity is to be required has been most explicit in the
separation of functions context, where proposals vary from extension of the current standards of §
554(d), not now applicable to formal rulemaking, see S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(c) (1979),
to segregation from the decisionmaker only of those agency employees most immediately involved in
presenting the agency's "case," S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 202 (1979).
170. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
171. The section-by-section analysis accompanying S. Doc. No. 2147, supra note 169, states
that "trial staff" are separated "because this is a job that can generally only be done well by people
who take an adversarial position toward the issues," an attitude fairly regarded as disqualifying in the
committee's view. Wider disqualification, however, would "affirmatively diminish the quality of
agency decisions" by restricting an agency's use of its expertise. 125 Cong. Rec. S19061 (daily ed.
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ily imply other protections for impartiality as to fact. By way of contrast, no
serious legislative consideration is being given to extending separation of func-
tion or prejudgment standards to settings in which a decision does not occur "on
the record" in some measure. If legislators are satisfied to have free discussion
within the agency, no matter how committed the discussants, it is hard to infer
significant concern with protecting objectivity.
In ordinary rulemaking, there is neither a statutorily defined record nor any,
indication that rulemaking is to be confined to one or assessed by one. Partici-
pants' procedural rights are rights of access, not rebuttal, and consequently the
pre-existence of a state of mind that would effectively impede one's ability to
rebut is an irrelevancy. If, however, Congress has adopted procedures defining a
record, requiring the results of rulemaking to be supported by "substantial evi-
dence," and, fairly read, recognizing an interest in rebuttal, then concern with
objectivity is a fair inference.
The interest in an opportunity to know, confront, and oppose or rebut
others' views is the central factor in this aspect of the analysis. Traditionally,
that has not been viewed as a feature of informal rulemaking. The APA states no
requirement that the agency expose its data base. If a commenter chooses to
submit its views at the last moment, others, however appalled, acquire no right
to force agency consideration of a reply. Of course, the conclusion reached will
vary with changes in the procedures employed. If an agency voluntarily conducts
rulemaking in a manner suggesting acceptance of the desirability of confrontation
as to some issues, application of disqualification standards may be implied. Re-
cent case law developments, notably in the D.C. Circuit, suggest increasing ac-
ceptance of the view that an opportunity for "adversarial comment" is an inher-
ent part of section 553 procedure. 72 Although the Administrative Conference
has rejected that view as "converting rulemaking proceedings into a species of
adjudication . . . neither practicable nor desirable," 173 its influence appears to
be growing. To the extent effective reply or adversarial critique is recognized as
a valid procedural claim in informal rulemaking, a right to objectivity in the
decisionmaker according to some standard is likely to follow.
Even in the setting in which some measure of impartiality will be required,
the ANA judges all agreed that the prejudgment inquiry should be more limited
than would be the case for adjudication. None of the congressional proposals or
discussions indicate a different judgment. The factors that underlie this apparent
judicial and legislative agreement are those already suggested in the introductory
material. 1 74
Dec. 18, 1979). While trial staff "bias" may not be inevitable, it should not be surprising; the
Conference study of FTC rulemaking under the Magnuson-Moss Act-which contains no comparable
separation of functions provision-finds that it has been generated in that particular setting. See also
note 19 supra.
172. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
173. ACUS Recommendation 77-3, I C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1980).
174. See text accompanying notes 16-25, 129-32 supra.
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Ordinary rulemaking is impossible without some prejudgment by the
rulemaker, and modem trends emphasize that requirement. A rulemaker must
form a preliminary view if he is to make a proposal; in Judge Leventhal's words,
"one cannot even conceive of an agency conducting a rulemaking proceeding
unless it had delved into the subject sufficiently to become concerned that there
was an evil or abuse that required regulatory response." 17' The increasing in-
sistence that administrators take formal responsibility for the formulation of
agency policy, 176 that rulemaking proposals be published with elaborate analyses
of possible economic and/or environmental impacts and realistic alternatives, and
that the proposals also reveal the data base on which the agency has acted-all
emphasize the inevitability of prejudgment. Even in the past, significant propos-
als for rulemaking were rarely the unsupervised product of low-ranking officials;
today it must be assumed that any significant proposal will have attracted sub-
stantial oversight-hence prejudgment- from the top.
Prejudgment is inevitable in another respect, shown by the absence of sep-
aration of functions constraints. At the staff level, no distinction is made be-
tween proponents (or, for that matter, opponents) of rulemaking and participants
in it; the integration of decisional function, the institutional decisional process, is
regarded as one of the strengths of rulemaking as a procedural mode. As some
respondents to the ACUS survey noted, the wide range of staff officials who
may participate in any given rulemaking is itself some assurance of objectivity.
The point, here, however, is that there is a wide range of participation, thought
to be important because of the contribution made to institutional decision; some
or all of these participants will have formed prejudgments whether or not their
superiors have, and they will take advocacy positions in the internal debate. It is
important to note that "disqualification" would reach these concerned agency
staff members as well as the commissioners themselves. The judgment not to
exclude them rests on practical political assessments that it is too expensive and
cumbersome to maintain agencies with multiple expert staffs; that the assistance
of these experts is more essential to sound policy formation than it would be to
resolving a particular dispute about the consequences to be attached to past ac-
tion; that the possible influence of emotional attachment to preformed concep-
tions is less harmful to private interests when those conceptions concern policy
matters subject to public discussion and legislative change rather than final de-
terminations of individual guilt. The public may, of course, reassess this bal-
ance, but present judgment is that it would be a mistake to do so. All the
opinions acknowledged these implications, although not focusing-as the facts
did not require them to-on the consequences of applying a disqualification
regime below the agency level.1 77
175. ANA, slip op. at 4.
176. See, e.g., the requirements for executive agency rulemaking stated in Exec. Order No.
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
177. E.g., ANA, slip op. at 35: "[A] neutral and detached adjudicator is simply an inapposite
role model for an administrator who must translate broad statutory commands into concrete social
policies."
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In addition to the prejudgments that rulemaking procedures require agency
actors to form, other aspects of agency functioning are at least conducive to their
formation. Agency heads are appointed in a political process to serve avowedly
political ends, and their success is measured by their ability to carry specific
desired policy into effect. They must regularly defend their programs to the
White House and Congress, to regulated industry and the public. In such a set-
ting, commitment is inevitable and desirable. Nor are outside contacts solely
confrontational; interchange of information and view is a continuing necessity for
any agency. The processes of acquiring information and discussing possible fu-
ture directions also produce and suggest prejudgments.
The range of probable legislative and judicial agreement here is suggested
by the very limited development of precedent and principle on "undue influ-
ence" and ex parte contacts, the descriptions usually made of behavior outside
the agency that might be productive of disapproved prejudgments. As mentioned
earlier, 17 8 strictures against congressional interference in adjudication are gener-
ally accepted, even welcomed; suggestions of impropriety are much harder to
find in the setting of policymaking.1 7 9  And while the courts and others have
begun to express limited concern with ex parte contacts in rulemaking, that con-
cern is generally conceded to be inappropriate for the time prior to notice of
proposed rulemaking, when agency prejudgments will most probably be
formed. 180 In earlier opinions, Judge MacKinnon opposed the extension of con-
straints in both these contexts, protesting what he regarded as excessive'interfer-
ence with a properly political process; 181 presumably, then, he accepts in ANA
the general legitimacy of political functions by agency rulemakers.
For the majority, these external political relationships were a major element
contributing to selection of a disqualification standard. That standard must not
"impinge[] upon the political process. An administrator's presence within an
agency reflects the political judgment of the President and Senate." 182 Discus-
sion of policy issues with industry and public, "appropriate and indeed manda-
tory for agency heads and staff," 183 "would be futile . . . if the administrator
could not test his own views on different audiences." 184 The majority was
resolute that restrictions on ex parte contacts would not possibly apply prior to
178. See text accompanying notes 123-28 supra.
179. In D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1030 (1972), the prevailing opinions were careful to state that the consideration of im-
proper factors, rather than the making of improper approaches, was the flaw; the decision there was
reached in informal adjudication, not rulemaking. Compare Texas Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 408 F.
Supp. 303 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (congressional pressure requires invalidation of rulemaking), with
Florida Dep't of Health v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (only "virulent" extrinsic
pressures, involving threats of political retaliation, are objectionable).
180. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); see ANA, slip op. at 36 n.40, 44 (Tamm, J.).
181. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 61-64; D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d at
1256-62.
182. ANA, slip op. at 48 (Tamm, J.).
183. Id. at 4 (Leventhal, J.).
184. Id. at 38 (Tamm, J.).
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notice of rulemaking; that conclusion of course implies freedom to make con-
tact 185 and thus to reveal attitudes or entertain dialogues that to others may
signal prejudgment.
At times, Judge MacKinnon's opinion appears to repudiate the majority's
emphasis on the irreducibly political character of rulemaking. He views the anal-
ogy to a legislator as inappropriate and infers from the Magnuson-Moss Act a
particular judgment to impose limits on political behavior by commissioners; he
hints that some such limits would apply even in informal rulemaking. 186 Yet
Judge MacKinnon denies any intent to prohibit the free interchange of ideas with
other officials or the public. "[P]ublic discussion of policy issues" is desirable,
but is to be distinguished from "haranguing the public"; discussing the wisdom
of various regulatory positions--acceptable behavior-is to be differentiated
from loud advocacy. 1 87 The practical workability of this distinction can be
questioned. It is even more difficult to distinguish the results of performing offi-
cial responsibilities from evidence of personal zeal in assessing the impact of
political contacts and responsibilities than in examining the consequences of
intra-agency rulemaking practices. The distinction thus invites doubt, litigation,
and variable outcome. If one accepts the distinction, however, the result can
fairly be characterized as substantial agreement by Judge MacKinnon with the
majority's views on the appropriateness of political contacts in rulemaking.
b. Matters in Dispute-What Standard Is to Apply to Which Issues? The
disagreements in the court of appeals principally focused on what standard of
disqualification should apply, and to what issues it should apply. The majority
insisted on a "clear and convincing" showing of "an unalterably closed mind";
the dissent, a preponderant showing of "substantial bias or prejudgment." The
majority and dissent each uses the adjective "critical" to describe the type of
fact to which its test would apply, but the majority's discussion makes it appear
that a "critical" matter must be very specific, one as to which cross-examination
must be provided under the Magnuson-Moss Act, while the dissent regards ulti-
mate conclusions and broadly defined social issues as coming within the test's
protective reach.
(i). Burden of demonstration. No established principle suggests favoring the
majority's "clear and convincing" standard or the dissent's "preponderance."
As indicated above1 88 and remarked in the dissent, 189 the general tendency in
recent enactments in other contexts has been to encourage disqualification.
Judges may no longer regard themselves as being under a "duty to sit"; man-
datory disqualification is to be assessed not by the judge's subjective belief in his
ability to be impartial, but by a "reasonable" observer's assessment whether his
185. See note 136 supra.
186. ANA, slip op. at 25-29. At the conclusion of this passage he remarks that "[clourts have
no power to [create] a legislative body of five members whose acts would not be subject to judicial
review except to the same extent as Congressional statutes," strongly implying delegation concerns
that would equally disable the Congress from creating such a body.
187. Id. at 31.
188. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
189. ANA, slip op. at 37 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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impartiality is subject to question. That burden is slighter for those challenging
judges than either opinion in ANA would require of individuals seeking disqual-
ification in a Magnuson-Moss rulemaking.
Reasons for repudiating so permissive an approach are apparent, and per-
suasive. In the agency context, the influence of necessity is substantially greater
than in federal courts. A court litigant has no cognizable interest in the identity
of the presiding judge at the trial, and if one is disqualified another of equal
authority ordinarily sits. In an agency, ultimate decision can be made by only
one, or, at most, a few individuals who are not interchangeable with available
substitutes. Even where decisions are taken by a multimember commission, the
removal of one or more commissioners at the behest of individual parties may,
by changing the commission's balance, disturb an intended and legitimate "polit-
ical judgment of the President and the Senate." 190 Particularly in the context of
policy formulation, where permitted policy views will be hard to distinguish
from prejudged fact and permitted discussion hard to tell from advocacy, applica-
tion of a standard as stringent as that applied to judges would, as the majority in
ANA feared, frequently "plunge courts into the midst of political battles concern-
ing the proper formulation of administrative policy." 1'9 ,
This conclusion does not, however, demonstrate either the majority or the
dissent to have been correct. All writing judges agreed on the need to avoid
encouraging adventitious disqualification claims and to protect agency
policymaking. All also agreed on the existence of a claim to impartiality in the
particular circumstances of the Magnuson-Moss Act. The balance to be struck
between fear of disruption and protection of objectivity was a policy judgment,
which the writing judges resolved in policy terms. To the writer, the majority's
resolution seems preferable; the integrated character of agency decisionmaking in
rulemaking, the centrality of policy and political concerns, and the irreducible
difficulty of reliably distinguishing policy from fact in the rulemaking context are
persuasive. That, however, does not make the minority wrong-just ill advised
from a given perspective. An analyst more highly valuing adversariness in party
behavior and objectivity in agency behavior will reach the opposite conclusion.
(ii). What is to be demonstrated? Principle also does not force choice be-
tween the majority's "unalterably closed mind" and the dissent's "substantial
bias or prejudgment." Both standards respect to some degree the difference be-
tween adjudication and policy formation, posing higher barriers to disqualifica-
tion than does the test applicable in judicial proceedings. Choice between them is
equally the product of a balancing process.
The dissent makes two observations about the majority test that may help
frame the context for this choice. First, it notes that the "unalterably closed
mind" test tolerates subjective self-evaluation in rulemaking, which is plainly
repudiated by statute for judicial disqualification; an administrator who responds
to a claim of prejudgment that he can consider all sides of the issue will not
easily be disqualified on the majority's test. Second, the dissent notes, the major-
190. Id. at 48 (Tamm, J.).
191. Id.
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ity's test is not fairly comparable to that applied to the disqualification of either
judges or jurors. Judge or juror disqualification standards would not tolerate
opinions on the facts that "would require evidence to remove"; 92 the majority
test does tolerate such opinions as long as they are not ineradicable.
Neither observation demonstrates that the majority is wrong. Even in the
judicial context, subjective self-evaluation of possible bias was long accepted as
the appropriate mode of analysis; the change to an objective standard has been
undertaken only with the increasing incidence of multijudge districts and the ease
of modem transportation. The stronger claims of necessity in the agency context
and the weaker claims for objectivity in rulemaking readily validate use of a
subjective test. Similarly, juror disqualification standards set a reference point
usefully defining what (further) requirements could fairly be regarded as exces-
sive, but do not demonstrate the test that must be met for rulemaking.
Indeed, any disqualification test must tolerate at least the degree of pre-
judgment inherent in the performance of rulemaking responsibilities. The process
of formulating a rule could easily lead a rulemaker to the point at which evi-
dence would be required to dislodge his preliminary judgment. The dissent does
not seem to propose that such prejudgments be regarded as "substantial." 193
Something more is required. So long as the dissent's formulation is understood
to accept the proposition most strongly stated in Withrow-that combined offi-
cial functions and any resultant prejudgment are not in themselves sufficient to
require disqualification-principle does not force a choice between it and the
majority's view.
(iii). As to what facts? It is clearly established-in judicial as well as ad-
ministrative settings-that only factual, not policy, issues are appropriate for
application of disqualification standards; what is such a factual issue in rulemak-
ing, however, is more controversial. In its prior consideration of the problems of
hybrid procedures, the Administrative Conference, following established lines of
scholarly analysis, has referred to several categories of facts. There is, first, the
distinction between "basic facts," the raw material of judgment, and "ultimate
facts," the judgment- and policy-laden conclusion of a fact-assessment process,
the ultimate matter to be found. Second, there is the distinction, discussed
above, 1 .4 between "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts, between facts of an
historical character pertaining to particular individuals and those involving
greater elements of judgment or detached from the particular circumstances of a
given participant in the proceeding. Finally, within the category of legislative
fact, the Conference has distinguished between "specific" and nonspecific fact,
the former presenting issues "sufficiently narrow in focus and sufficiently mate-
rial to the outcome" to make the use of trial-type procedures for their determina-
tion "reasonable and useful." 195 In its recent study of Magnuson-Moss Act
192. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557 (1962), cited inANA, slip op. at 35 n.II (Mac-
Kinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
193. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
194. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
195. See ACUS Recommendation 72-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1606,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974) (report on Magnuson-Moss Act), both cited with approval in the
majority opinion in ANA, slip op. at 23-24.
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rulemaking the Conference commended the development of approaches like those
already employed by the Environmental Protection Agency, which limit the use
of trial-type procedures to issues of "specific fact." 196
The various categories are hardly airtight and may be excessively scholastic,
but they are reasonably well understood and-although subject to the strains
suggested earlierI1--they identify with reasonable fidelity those circumstances
traditionally thought to require the protections of adversary process before an
"impartial" decider. Even for judges, "legislative facts" are subject to unregu-
lated judicial notice-while there are strong suggestions that "specific facts"
ought not to be so lightly found, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
were unable to write the formula that would produce that result without working
mischief to judicial policy formulation. 19 8  The ANA majority, accepting these
analyses, would find disqualification appropriate only for issues of "adjudica-
tive" or "specific" fact. Indeed, the majority builds on the difficulty of the
distinctions as an argument against ready disqualification: because "the factual
component of generalized rulemaking cannot be severed from the pure policy
aspects of the rule," 199 a distinctly factual prejudgment cannot readily be distin-
guished from a prejudgment of policy of which the law should take no heed. The
dissent, on the other hand, regards a broad range of prejudgments as possibly
"factual" for prejudgment purposes, ignoring these distinctions.
Indeed, it is surprising that the ANA court reached the merits of the disqual-
ification issue rather than reversing on prematurity grounds. The rulemaking in
ANA had not yet proceeded to the point of identifying any particular issues as
having the materiality, specificity, and controversiality to require on-the-record
trial under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The factual assertions which had been made
by Chairman Pertschuk were of the most general character-that small children
are impressionable, that use of sugared foods contributes to tooth decay, and so
forth. These are "legislative" propositions ill suited to adversary processes and
falling well outside the range of specific dispute over technological or like mat-
ters that can be "decisively resolved by testimony" 200 and that had led first the
D.C. Circuit and then Congress to provide an occasion for hybrid rulemak-
ing. 20 1  If apparent prejudgment of such broadly framed issues, much less the
"ultimate fact" of need for a rule to remedy these problems, 20 2 suffices to estab-
196. Commentary by Conference officials at the time the Magnuson-Moss Act was under con-
sideration had pointed in the same direction. See ANA, slip op. at 24, 25, citing communications of
Chairman Scalia and Executive Secretary Berg.
197. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
198. See id.
199. ANA, slip op. at 20.
200. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966).
201. An FTC administrative law judge has recommended in the continuation of the ANA pro-
ceeding that the extent to which children can distinguish between commercials and programs "to the
point that they comprehend the selling purpose of television advertising aimed at children" be made
one of the "disputed issues" for oral hearing in the proceeding. That recommendation may, of
course, be in error or embody a political or litigation-avoidance judgment, as much as a judgment
that this is a matter best suited for resolution by adversary trial.
202. ANA, slip op. at 37 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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lish disqualification, policymaking will indeed be impinged upon-both by the
occasions given for litigation and by the impact of permitting a collateral issue to
interfere with the rulemaking process.
The working hypothesis of the Conference's recent work, and the predom-
inant body of contemporary administrative law scholarship, is that the "specific
fact" distinction can be made. A characteristic of "specific facts" is that they
do not require judgment, prediction, or policy orientation for determination. Al-
though not "adjudicative facts" in the strictest sense-involving neither specific
individuals nor historic circumstances-specific facts by hypothesis share the
characteristics of concreteness and provability that make trial-type procedures
superior for their determination. Determining the ductile strength of a given steel
alloy differs from making a judgment about the anticompetitive impact of joint
ownership of television stations and newspapers, in just this way. Facts about
ductility can be developed through evidentiary hearings, and are severable from
policy issues. To this extent the majority appears to be wrong. If a disqualifica-
tion standard would be limited in its application to "specific facts," narrowly
defined, policymaking functions would not be threatened. With careful definition
of "fact" and "policy" no established principle favors the majority's formula-
tion of a disqualification standard over the dissent's. Only the scope of applica-
tion threatens effective policymaking. The implication of this analysis is, of
course, that whether disqualifying prejudgment of specific facts in issue exists
cannot be determined until those facts and the issues respecting them have been
defined. 20 3
Judge MacKinnon, however, was concerned with prejudgments not of
specific fact, but "of the ultimate fact involved-the 'evil' of such advertis-
ing." 204 He objected not to Chairman Pertschuk's policy judgment that rules
controlling advertisement of sugared cereals on children's television program-
ming might be appropriate, but to his behavior as a "loud advocate[] . . . ha-
ranguing the public," his "vigorous and consistent advocacy." 205 Taking these
observations at face value, one can suggest that the dissenting concern here is
not with factual prejudgment but with decorum and the collection of considera-
tions generally described under the heading "animus." The judge's perception
was that Chairman Pertschuk set out to achieve a given result. What the underly-
ing facts might be is less important than his apparent indifference to them. It
may even be that his inner conviction is regarded as less important than his
public behavior-behavior likely to engender disrespect for the agency's ac-
tions. 20 6
203. See note 201 supra.
204. ANA, slip op. at 37.
205. Id. at 31.
206. See Note, Regulator Disqualification from Rulemaking Proceedings, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1193
(1979).
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B. "Animus" or Partisan Zeal
The appearance of having taken sides with or against one of the participants
is a well-established ground for judicial disqualification.2 0 7 Even if a judge has
learned all he knows within the four comers of the record, he may be disqual-
ified if his behavior signals a loss of the necessary capacity to remain objective
in assessing new material. Yet it is the business of judges to reach judgments on
the basis of the material that unfolds before them, and it is inevitable that these
judgments will form as the trial proceeds, that their shape will become apparent
(if not immalleable) over time. A rule permitting ready disqualification of judges
who appeared to be drawing conclusions from the matter properly before them
would provide too easy a shield for the avoidance of deserved defeat; there is
also the risk, borne out on occasion, that parties fearing defeat would be tempted
to provoke the judge into a disqualifying show of judgment. For such reasons,
courts discussing this aspect of judicial disqualification express no concern for
the presence or strength of a judge's inner conviction absent evidence of disqual-
ifying sources of information; public conduct is required. And such conduct, one
senses, is viewed very much in context-against the backdrop formed by the
behavior of the complaining party and the reviewing courts' appreciation of the
normal pressures and tendencies of extended, hotly contested litigation. Only
behavior reflecting irrational attachments or leanings appears to provoke appel-
late censure. Courts seek an indication of judicial attitude toward the parties2 0 8
not rationally explainable in terms of the events disclosed of record. The risks of
party manipulation otherwise are too high. The result is a very low apparent rate
of disqualification relative to the number of occasions on which it might be
sought on these grounds.
Disqualification for animus in agency rulemaking would be further compli-
cated, particularly at the agency top, by the characteristics setting rulemaking
apart from adjudication: the pre-notice involvement of agency heads in identify-
ing the occasion for a rule and developing a proposal; the need for and appro-
priateness of their commitment to implement particular policies, commitments
that may have sparked their appointment; and the need for and appropriateness of
discussing evolving agency policy within and without the government, both to
provoke sharing of information and views and to encourage voluntary com-
pliance and political support. All of these activities are likely to produce outward
indications of leaning and commitment. Consequently, to permit disqualification
claims is to risk engendering litigation which-even if it does not often
succeed-could chill important aspects of agency public life. The result would
be to reduce the political controls over agencies, valid and valued controls that
do not operate against judges or those acting in a judicial capacity. The more
207. See note 76 supra.
208. Attitude toward the parties, although not always readily distinguishable from prejudgment
as to disputed fact, is at the core in this context. A disposition to disbelieve the witnesses or distrust
the motives or good faith of a party is the attitude characterizing judicial "animus" cases.
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importance one attaches to these political processes and controls, the more
hazardous is an animus ground for disqualification.2 0 9
It is on the question of animus, moreover, that the conflict of interests
analysis undertaken above210 is most instructive. Even formal prior association
with a participant in rulemaking does not require government executives and
policymakers to step aside. Yet these associations plainly signal party affilia-
tions. Although, increasingly, cooling-off periods are regarded as appropriate for
those who come to government from employment in which they would have had
a financial stake in the outcome of a proceeding pending at the time of their
employment and in which they had participated, this judgment may exclude gen-
eral rulemaking-another indication that likely commitment is not regarded as
important. Most important here, cooling-off periods prompted by associations
with nonfinancial interests are currently observed chiefly as a voluntary matter
and if adopted for the future (a step for which reasonable arguments can be
made) will inevitably be hedged with substantial restrictions. The reasons for
caution in extending conflict of interests analysis in this way reflect recognition
of the legitimacy of strong policy views as an element of the appointive process
and subsequent governmental action.
Whether rules permitting disqualification for demonstrated strength of feel-
ing toward the subject of a rulemaking 211 would inhibit reasonable public dis-
cussion is, as an empirical question, not readily answered. Analogous concerns
were felt in connection with enactment of the Freedom of Information 212 and
Government in the Sunshine Acts; 2 13 the extent to which those measures have
inhibited candid exchange of views has not been measured, nor can it easily be
calculated whether, even assuming such impacts, the acts have conferred a net
public benefit. To the writer, however, the argument that inhibition will occur
seems the stronger. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC2 1 4 has helped shape the character of
209. The dispute between majority and minority in ANA is perhaps best understood in these
terms. The majority stresses the political functions of rulemakers-functions independent of proce-
dure as such. The dissent underscores the judicial characteristics of the procedures employed at one
stage of the rulemaking, and in arguing that Chairman Pertschuk must be disqualified stresses his
partisanship, his political ends in view, and the political settings in which he sought to build support
for the soon-to-be-proposed rule. It is precisely the element of zeal, of attitude not toward fact as
such but the supposed motives of the cereal manufacturers/advertisers and the outcome of the pro-
ceeding, that draws Judge MacKinnon's sharpest fire. See, e.g., slip op. at 31.
210. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
211. One might not reach the same conclusions where focused personal hostility toward a par-
ticular participant could be shown-an improbable but possible state of affairs in rulemaking. In this
context, the inquiry might be whether the affairs of the particular participant are so near the heart of
the rulemaking as to suggest the possibility of a vendetta; or whether the participant's affairs are of
peripheral concern or any hostility is expressed chiefly in its own behavior. See note 76 and accom-
panying text supra. But for the unusual case in which the possibility of vendetta might be made to
appear, the dissent's test is well within reach of both general expectations and probable congressional
outlook; it does not appear overly threatening to ordinary rulemaking processes or relationships.
212. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
213. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)).
214. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
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congressional oversight of agency adjudication; Texaco and Cinderella 215 pro-
duce careful internal reviews of commissioner speeches against current dockets.
Similar impacts on speechmaking and congressional appearances seem likely to
occur in this context. It does not follow that those impacts are objectionable; that
the gain in agency independence or public perceptions of fairness and "objectiv-
ity" do not counterbalance any losses. It bears repeating in making any such
assessment, however, that in on-the-record adjudication both the values and the
practical attainability of objectivity in the decisionmaker are at the core and polit-
ical controls are regarded as inappropriate; for rulemaking, political controls are
workable and generally accepted. In the current dispute over advertising directed
to children, for example, most think it appropriate for Congress to discuss and
act on the question of whether FTC competence extends to "unfair" as well as
"deceptive" commercial practice even while that issue is pending at the FTC.
Insulating FTC commissioners and staff from political discussions respecting
such questions has much larger consequences than insulating them from political
discussions of whether Pillsbury Co. has engaged in particular anticompetitive
conduct.
Political controls also seem likely to serve as significant nonjudicial correc-
tives for indecorous behavior. The recent legislative debates over FTC authority
were fueled in no small measure by Chairman Pertschuk's public activism, in-
cluding specifically his speeches on advertising directed to children. Seeming a
partisan has real and immediate political impacts generally well understood by
Washington regulators, impacts tending to promote judiciousness in expression
but not threatening collateral litigation or the defeat of otherwise acceptable pol-
icy initiatives years after the agency's decision. The existence of the political
controls, wholly inappropriate for judges or adjudication, both diminishes any
need for judicial controls and signals their undesirability.
A rule permitting disqualification for apparent strength of feeling toward the
subject of a rulemaking, then, is inappropriate in the absence of rather direct
indications of congressional provision for such a rule. The result is too unusual,
in terms of general expectations or Congress's own behavior, to make that infer-
ence easily. In particular, provision for hybrid or modified rulemaking proce-
dures does not seem sufficient support. It is reasonable to infer from such a
provision the judgment that a measure of objectivity is required as to the
"specific facts" that are sharply in dispute. That flows more or less directly
from the determination that trial-type procedures are appropriate for the assess-
ment of these facts. It requires a further step to infer the judgment that the
regulator may not have political commitments to act or enthusiasm for acting in
the policy arena on which those facts bear. And that further step, if taken, will
carry disqualification procedures into a setting in which extreme caution has been
taken even as to judges-in recognition both of the natural consequences of
decisionmaking in any complex matter, and of the dangers of party manipula-
tion. For these reasons the majority test-or none at all-seems clearly prefera-
ble.
215. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text supra.
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One may test these conclusions against Assistant Secretary Bingham's pas-
sionate speech to the Steelworkers. 216 Here, unlike ANA, the question of dis-
qualification was raised only after the rulemaking was complete, on the basis of
a speech given at a time when, inevitably, the intellectual process of reaching
judgment would have been complete. The remarks she made indicate strong
commitments on a variety of matters, ranging from the political to the technical.
Undoubtedly, too, Dr. Bingham brought from her role in private life as a
specialist in workplace health hazards strongly held views about the needs for
worker safety; she had been selected precisely because of her background and
attitude.
The largest element of the objections, as with Chairman Pertschuk, appears
to have been to Dr. Bingham's choice of forum and manner. The speech was
openly political, given as the most hotly objected of Chairman Pertschuk's re-
marks had been, to a constituency on the opposite side of the issue. From an
industrialist's perspective, it must seem very raw, and would equally have
seemed so had the speech been given after adoption of the standard. But at this
level of generality, raw as it is, no requirement of detachment can be inferred
from the statute or otherwise. In describing her trips through "the palace
guard," Dr. Bingham described existing political processes of control that are an
inherent part of rulemaking as currently understood; repudiation of those proces-
ses, if warranted, should not be accomplished through the back door of a dis-
qualification standard. Solicitation of political support is equally part of an Assis-
tant Secretary's job as now understood. Remarks about inflationary impact or
attitudes toward the willingness of society to bear the added costs of worker
protection, however strongly felt or misguided, are far too general to suggest
prejudgment; they reflect the sorts of broad political attitudes that all experienced
persons bring to public office.
Dr. Bingham's remarks about medical removal protection similarly fail to
suggest prejudgments of fact. "Medical removal protection" is a regulatory
measure requiring companies to maintain workers removed from a work envi-
ronment for health reasons at their former rate of pay. OSHA's authority to
impose such a measure and the need for it were hotly contested, but neither issue
suggests disputes of fact as to which cross-examination or the ability to decide
solely on the basis of a record are requisite. Even if, as appears, Dr. Bingham
came to office with unshakeable views on these matters, that would be no occa-
sion to disqualify. Whether she was wrong on the question of authority will of
course be resolved by the courts; the disposition to impose a certain measure
within her authority, if known, would be a valid reason only for making or
withholding her appointment.
In short, the speech-fiery as it was-appears not to have reflected pre-
judgments on particular contested issues of specific fact. Its fire may well have
cast discredit on the result in some quarters, contributed to a sense of unfairness
or social malaise unfortunate in a society that depends largely on good will and
voluntary compliance for adherence to law. The proper correctives, however, are
216. See note 13 supra.
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political, not judicial; a judicial corrective would of necessity extend require-
ments of objectivity beyond their reach even in analogous judicial circumstances
and correspondingly impair the necessary political controls of the regulatory sys-
tem. 21 7
CONCLUSION
This analysis produces some reasonably firm conclusions and leaves other
matters to political judgment.
Taking first the question of conflict of interests, disqualification in rulemak-
ing is plainly appropriate in those circumstances, largely defined by federal stat-
ute, that involve present significant risks of present financial self-dealing. Man-
datory disqualification for conflict of interest seems equally inappropriate on the
ground merely of violation of the government's general precepts of ethical
employee behavior. Between these poles lie the questions of whether adoption of
a rule precluding investments only in companies principally regulated by an
agency is sufficient protection against disqualifying self-dealing; and whether
conflicts arising out of prior employment or present nonfinancial interests should
be disqualifying. Answers to these questions derive from experience and world
view, not logic; but extension of conflict of interest enforcement in each of these
areas would reflect current trends. The indirect impacts of rulemaking on finan-
cial holdings can be substantial and so, in a society concerned to avoid self-
dealing, disabling. "Cooling off periods," in increasing use, reflect heightened
awareness that changes in associations do not produce sharp and immediate
changes in loyalty or prior perspective. A legal system recognizing that nonfi-
nancial interests can be substantial enough to sustain a claim to participate or sue
seems also likely to recognize that they can be productive of disabling conflict.
Disqualification for bias or prejudgment in rulemaking had not been an es-
tablished remedy prior to the decisions in ANA, and is not provided for in
agency rules or practice. Federal agencies generally state a commitment to
openmindedness on the part of decisionmakers, but rely on voluntary recusal.
Analytically, the proposition that disqualification may be constitutionally re-
quired for fairness is very weak. Any such requirement is inferable only from
particular statutory requirements of procedures suggestive of a need for objectiv-
ity. Nothing in APA section 553 supports such an inference, but an inference
that protected objectivity in some measure is required could be drawn from stat-
utes requiring use of trial-type procedures to a greater or lesser degree.
How much objectivity, how severe the disqualification test, is the more
difficult question. A proper test must not interfere with necessary elements of
217. The D.C. Circuit decided the United Steelworkers case on Aug. 15, 1980, upholding the
rule against this challenge. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 15, 1980). The court admonished Dr. Bingham for "making statements so susceptible of an
inference of bias, especially statements to a group so passionately involved." Slip op. at 18. But it
found no commentary on specific factual issues that could warrant application of the ANA test.
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policymaking activity; neither acts nor beliefs producing the decision to initiate a
rule, the formulation of a proposal, or the conduct of policy discussions with
Congress, the regulated industry, or the public should be regarded as disqualify-
ing. A further proposition, mirroring the rules applicable to judicial disqualifica-
tion, is that only prejudgment as to "fact" is even arguably disqualifying. Since
the requirement of objectivity derives from statutory inference, the range of dis-
qualification is appropriately limited to those facts subject to that inference-in
the case of hybrid rulemaking procedures, the specific facts as to which full
adversary procedures may be required.
Within the boundaries thus suggested, principle suggests no basis for choos-
ing between a test of disqualification requiring a "clear and convincing" showing
of "an unalterably closed mind" and one turning upon a preponderant showing
of "substantial bias or prejudgment." The two tests reflect differing emphases,
one preferring noninterference in an inevitably political process and the other,
assurance of objectivity where a requirement of objectivity may fairly be in-
ferred. But both tests place an appropriately greater burden of demonstration on the
party seeking disqualification in rulemaking than would have to be met in ad-
judication. Within the suggested limits, neither is demonstrably wrong.
If one moves from the specific facts that may be shown in any case of
hybrid rulemaking to warrant full trial consideration to the broader ranges of
"legislative" or "ultimate" fact, the question shifts from factual prejudgment or
bias to animus or partisan zealotry. While decorum in the conduct of public
business is greatly to be sought, the hazards of seeking to enforce it in a
rulemaking context, avowedly political, are even greater than they would be in
the context of judicial activity. In this setting, absent evident personal vendetta,
one might well prefer to leave correction of indecorous behavior entirely to the
political realm-to congressional reaction, loss of public acceptance, and colle-
gial censure. If disqualification is to be entertained at all by the courts, the
barriers must be set extremely high.
APPENDIX
At its June 6, 1980, plenary session, the Administrative Conference adopted
the following recommendations based on the preceding report:
RECOMMENDATION 80-4
DECISIONAL OFFICIALS' PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS218
A. Procedures
1. Each rulemaking agency should promulgate procedures by means of
which persons who desire to participate in a rulemaking proceeding (or who may
218. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendations, 45 Fed. Reg. 46771,
46776 (1980) (to be codified in I C.F.R. § 305.80-4).
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be affetted by its outcome) can challenge the suitability of participation by par-
ticular decisional personnel in that proceeding. The procedures should identify
the factors that bear on suitability and should indicate the appropriate time,
place, and means of making challenges, along with an indication of opportunity
for intra-agency review if one be available.
2. The procedures should also make plain that a decisional official, whether
or not challenged, may voluntarily abstain from participating in a particular pro-
ceeding.
B. Conf7ict of Interests
I. A decisional official whose financial interests or those of whose im-
mediate family may be distinctively favored by choices to be made in a particu-
lar rulemaking proceeding should voluntarily abstain (or be required by the
agency to abstain) from participation in that proceeding, subject to publicly
stated and applied agency exceptions for de minimis holdings.
2. New agency officials should be subjected to "cooling off" periods of
variable duration, during which their participation in a rulemaking proceeding
would presumably be inappropriate if
(i) the proceeding specifically affects the financial interests of an im-
mediately prior employer or client; or
(ii) the official's immediately prior employer or client is a participant in
the proceeding; or
(iii) the official has participated in the proceeding before becoming a public
employee.
An agency's application of a "cooling off" requirement should not, how-
ever, reflect absolutes. It should take into account the following factors, singly
or in combination:
(a) the extent of the official's participation in a prior private capacity
in the pending rulemaking proceeding;
(b) the elapse of time between the prior involvement and the official's
present activity as a public employee;
(c) the nature and magnitude of the rulemaking's possible impact on
the interests of the prior employer;
(d) the generality or specificity of the rulemaking's scope;
(e) the extent of the prior employer's participation;
(f) applicable professional standards;
(g) Senatorial consideration, during the confirmation process, of the
official's prior relationships and activities.
3. An official's non-financial interests, associations, or activities (whether
or not related to past employment) may in some instances suggest the desirability
of recusal or, if need be, a direction to the official to abstain from participating
in a particular proceeding. If the official's appointment has been confirmed by
the Senate with knowledge of the appointee's past interests and activities, a re-
quired cooling off period would ordinarily be inappropriate. As to officials of
lesser prominence, however, agencies may suitably utilize in respect of non-
financial interests the procedures sketched above, related to financial conflict of
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interests or to cooling off periods. The question of precluding participation
should arise only when an identifiable interest is significant in relation to the
proceeding and is likely to be substantially affected by its outcome. Mere mem-
bership in an association would not ordinarily be a ground for disqualification or
recusal.
4. Finally, agency conflict of interests rules should make emphatically plain
that they are in aid of the agency's self-management; that they are measures in
furtherance of its own quality control rather than in amplification of judicial
control; and that they are agency declarations for guidance of its own staff con-
cerning decorum. An agency that is insensitive or lax in fulfilling its declared
expectations will no doubt be of concern to the Congress or to the Executive, but
an agency's heightened attentiveness to the qualities of decisional personnel
should plainly not expand the occasions for or the scope of review of rulemaking
proceedings.
C. Prejudgment of Fact
1. Disqualification for prejudgment in rulemaking should be limited to pre-
judgments of particular "adjudicative" or "specific" facts, where it may be
inferred from the particular statutory framework, agency procedural choices, or
other special circumstances that the agency's determination of those facts is to be
based on the evidentiary record developed in the proceeding. Cause for disqual-
ification can appropriately be decided by the agency only after it is established in
the proceeding that such facts will be materially at issue in the proceeding. Such
disqualification is inappropriate for factual judgments that are the consequence of
earlier stages of the proceeding, of for prejudgments of policy.
2. To avoid undue interference with the legislative, policy-making aspect of
the rulemaking process and other agency functions, disqualification for prejudg-
ment of fact should be considered by the agency only after it has determined that
critical "adjudicative" of "specific" facts require resolution on the evidentiary
record developed in the proceeding, and should require at least a preponderant
showing that an agency member or decisional employee has a closed mind re-
garding those facts.
D. Decorum and Expression of Views
A rulemaking proceeding should be conducted with decorum and respect for
the interests of all concerned. Agency officials should therefore conscientiously
avoid intemperate expression or other behavior suggestive of an irrevocable
commitment to a predetermined outcome of the proceeding. This does not mean,
however, that agency officials may not express factual judgments based on pre-
vious experience or on information received during a proceeding; nor does it
suggest that officials may not act upon or voice opinions concerning underlying
issues of policy. Expressing those opinions in interchanges with committees of
the Congress, other administrative bodies, the public, and regulated groups is a
desirable normality of administration, rather than an abnormality to be shunned,
and is not a basis on which exclusion from a proceeding may appropriately be
suggested.
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